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UP IN SMOKE? UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
RETAIL MARIJUANA LAWS FOR PARTNERSHIPS 
Lauren A. Newell† 
“When governors have asked me, and several have, I say that we don’t have the 
facts . . . . We don’t know what the unintended consequences are going to be . . . . 
What I do is urge caution. Make sure you look at it very thoroughly.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, when Colorado citizens petitioned to legalize the retail sale 
of marijuana in their state, Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper 
publicly opposed the ballot measure.2 Among the other reasons for his 
opposition,3 Governor Hickenlooper knew that it would put Colorado 
in uncharted territory as the first state to legalize recreational marijuana 
sales.4 He worried about legalizing marijuana sales at the state level in 
the face of federal laws that make selling marijuana a crime.5 Governor 
 
 2 John Ingold, Colorado Gov. John Hickenlooper Opposes Marijuana-Legalization Measure, 
DENVER POST (Sept. 12, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21530165/colorado-
gov-john-hickenlooper-opposes-marijuana-legalization-measure (noting Governor 
Hickenlooper’s opposition to the ballot initiative that would legalize the recreational use and 
retail sale of marijuana); see COLO. CONST. amend. 64 (codified as amended at COLO. CONST. 
art. XVIII, § 16), http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2011-
2012/30Final.pdf (2012 ballot initiative legalizing recreational use and retail sale of marijuana). 
 3 See Matt Ferner, Gov. John Hickenlooper Opposes Legal Weed: ‘Colorado Is Known for 
Many Great Things, Marijuana Should Not Be One of Them’, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12, 
2012, 7:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/12/gov-john-hickenlooper-opp_n_18
79248.html (describing Hickenlooper’s opposition to Amendment 64 on the basis of concern 
for public health and the potential that young people would be saddled with felony records). 
 4 See Chuck Slothower, Hickenlooper: I Hate this Experiment, DURANGO HERALD (Colo.) 
(Jan. 10, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.durangoherald.com/article/20140110/NEWS01/140119986 
(quoting Hickenlooper as saying: “I hate Colorado having to be the experiment.”); see also infra 
notes 23–46 and accompanying text for a brief history of marijuana legalization in the United 
States. 
 5 See Ferner, supra note 3 (quoting Hickenlooper’s concern that “[f]ederal laws would 
remain unchanged in classifying marijuana as a Schedule I substance, and federal authorities 
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Hickenlooper knew that legalizing retail marijuana sales would come 
with “unintended consequences.”6 
About the unintended consequences, at least, Governor 
Hickenlooper was right.7 Currently, twenty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia have legalized the possession and/or sale of marijuana for 
medical or recreational use (or both),8 despite the fact that federal law 
criminalizes it. Scholars have identified a host of practical and legal 
problems caused by the combination of state legalization and federal 
prohibition, in realms ranging from banking, taxation, legal 
representation, employment law, family law, and others.9 Still, 
additional fields affected by marijuana legislation have yet to be 
addressed in depth. 
One of these nascent fields is business law—that is, the unintended 
consequences of state marijuana legalization for business entities that 
engage in marijuana-related activities. A recent article suggests that 
these entities may lose important business law protections, such as 
limited liability.10 Otherwise, the scholarly discussion has largely 
overlooked the ramifications of state marijuana legalization for state 
business entity laws. This Article introduces a significant, new business 
law discussion: the unintended consequences of state marijuana 
legalization for the formation and dissolution of partnerships. It bases 
its discussion in the laws of the first state to legalize retail marijuana 
sales, Colorado.11 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the laws 
regulating marijuana at the federal and state levels, and the interplay 
between them, and establishes that Colorado’s marijuana laws implicate 
its partnership laws. Part II introduces Colorado’s partnership laws, 
with particular focus on the laws of partnership formation and 
 
have been clear they will not turn a blind eye toward states attempting to trump those laws”). 
See also infra text accompanying notes 14–33 for a description of marijuana’s legal status under 
federal law. 
 6 See Balz, supra note 1 (quoting Governor Hickenlooper). 
 7 This Article takes no position on whether the sale of marijuana should be legalized for 
medical or recreational purposes. 
 8 State Marijuana Laws in 2016 Map, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/
state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2016). Alaska, 
California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the District of 
Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational use. Id. 
 9 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 
UCLA L. REV. 74, 91–100 (2015); Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2015); Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 523 (2014); Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other 
Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 223. 
 10 See generally Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business 
Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511 (2015). 
 11 See infra notes 47–48. 
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dissolution. It then identifies how inconsistencies between the state 
marijuana laws and the state partnership laws result in unintended 
consequences for partnerships. Next, it scrutinizes three potential 
arguments aimed at convincing a Colorado court that the statutory 
inconsistencies do not mandate the negative outcomes this Article 
identifies. Part III examines the practical consequences for partnerships 
of the inconsistencies between the marijuana and partnership laws; it 
then critiques several possible remedies for the problems posed before 
advocating an amendment of the state marijuana laws as the most 
promising solution. Finally, this Article concludes by advising states that 
legalize marijuana sales in the future to proceed slowly and learn from 
others’ mistakes so that they may avoid unintended consequences of 
their own. 
I.     THE MARIJUANA LAWS 
Marijuana is subject to regulation at the federal, state, and local 
levels. This Part first describes marijuana’s legal status under federal law. 
It then introduces the state laws12 governing Colorado’s marijuana-
related businesses and briefly addresses the issue of whether state laws 
are preempted by federal laws regulating marijuana. Finally, this Part 
establishes how Colorado’s marijuana laws are relevant to partnerships.  
 
A.     Federal Law13 
The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), enacted in 1970, 
criminalizes the sale of marijuana.14 Section 841(a)(1) of the CSA 
provides that it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with 
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,” 
except as authorized by the CSA.15 The CSA designates marijuana a 
“Schedule I” controlled substance, meaning it “has a high potential for 
abuse,” “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment,” and 
 
 12 Various Colorado localities have their own laws pertaining to the sale of marijuana. See, 
e.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, art. V, §§ 6-200 to -219 (2013) (retail 
marijuana code for the City and County of Denver). For simplicity, this Article largely ignores 
the local laws. 
 13 For a detailed history of marijuana regulation in the United States see Chemerinsky et al., 
supra note 9, at 81–90. 
 14 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012). 
 15 Id. § 841(a)(1). 
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“[t]here is a lack of accepted safety” for its use under medical 
supervision.16 Schedule I is the most restrictive controlled substance 
designation in the CSA.17 The only purpose authorized under the CSA 
for a Schedule I substance is its use in a federally authorized study; this 
means the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of marijuana, or the 
possession with intent to do one of those things, is a federal crime—a 
felony.18 Despite repeated calls to remove marijuana from Schedule I,19 
the federal government has consistently refused to do so,20 and federal 
courts have upheld these refusals.21 
Less consistent than the refusal to remove marijuana from 
Schedule I has been federal policy regarding enforcement of the CSA in 
the face of state medical and retail marijuana laws.22 California became 
the first state to legalize the sale of marijuana for medical use in 1996 
with the passage of Proposition 215,23 and others soon followed 
California’s lead. When President Barack Obama was sworn into office 
in 2009, medical marijuana laws had been passed in thirteen states.24 
During his campaign, President Obama seemed friendly to state 
marijuana legalization, saying, “I’m not going to be using Justice 
Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on this issue.”25 
President Obama’s attorney general, Eric Holder, indicated shortly after 
 
 16 Id. § 812(b)(1), Schedule I (c)(10). 
 17 See id. § 812(b). 
 18 Id. § 841(b)(1)(B), (D). 
 19 See, e.g., All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 
1994); All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); 
Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Respect States’ and Citizens’ Rights Act of 2013, H.R. 964, 113th Cong. (2013); Respect States’ 
and Citizens’ Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 6606, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 20 E.g., Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 
53,688 (Aug. 12, 2016); Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 76 
Fed. Reg. 40,552 (July 8, 2011). 
 21 See, e.g., Americans for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (holding the federal Drug Enforcement Agency’s denial of a petition to reschedule 
marijuana survived review under the arbitrary and capricious standard). 
 22 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 86–90 (discussing fluctuations in the federal 
government’s degree of antagonism toward marijuana following President Obama’s election); 
Scheuer, supra note 10, at 524–28 (calling the federal government’s responses to state marijuana 
laws “inconsistent” and describing the various responses). 
 23 1996 Cal. Leg. Serv. Prop. 215 (codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007)). 
 24 See 28 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, 
PROCON, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last 
updated Feb. 24, 2017, 3:18 PM) (listing California (1996), Alaska (1998), Oregon (1998), 
Washington (1998), Maine (1999), Nevada (2000), Colorado (2000), Hawaii (2000), Montana 
(2004), Vermont (2004), Rhode Island (2006), New Mexico (2007), and Michigan (2008) as 
having medical marijuana laws in place prior to 2009). 
 25 Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2012), http://
www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216#ixzz3wz5COouj (quoting 
President Obama).  
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President Obama took office that this campaign promise would be the 
new federal policy.26 And, soon thereafter, Deputy Attorney General 
David Ogden released a memorandum to U.S. attorneys in states that 
had legalized medical marijuana with the following guidance regarding 
federal enforcement priorities: 
As a general matter, pursuit of [federal] priorities should not focus 
federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in 
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws 
providing for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution 
of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use 
marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent 
with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and 
unambiguous compliance with existing state law who provide such 
individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an efficient use of 
limited federal resources.27 
Thus, all signs from the early days of the Obama presidency indicated 
that the federal government would not enforce the CSA in states that 
legalized marijuana sales. 
Despite these early indications, the federal government did not 
turn out to be as friendly to marijuana businesses as anticipated. A new 
Department of Justice memorandum from Deputy Attorney General 
Ogden to U.S. attorneys in 2011 declared that “[t]he Department of 
Justice is committed to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances 
Act in all States” and that 
[t]he Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield 
[commercial marijuana] activities from federal enforcement action 
and prosecution, even where those activities purport to comply with 
state law. Persons who are in the business of cultivating, selling or 
distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such 
activities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 
regardless of state law.28 
 
 26 See Stu Woo & Justin Scheck, California Marijuana Dispensaries Cheer U.S. Shift on 
Raids, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB123656023550966719 (“The attorney general signaled recently that states will be able to set 
their own medical-marijuana laws, which President Barack Obama said during his campaign 
that he supported. What Mr. Obama said then ‘is now American policy,’ Mr. Holder said.”). 
 27 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM FOR 
SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES 
AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf. 
 28 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM FOR 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING THE OGDEN MEMO IN JURISDICTIONS 
SEEKING TO AUTHORIZE MARIJUANA FOR MEDICAL USE 1–2 (June 29, 2011), http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-
marijuana-use.pdf. 
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A wave of enforcement actions in California,29 Montana,30 and 
Colorado31 followed shortly thereafter. 
But, in yet another turn, after Colorado and Washington State 
passed initiatives permitting recreational marijuana sales,32 a third 
memorandum from the Department of Justice suggested that the federal 
government would permit those laws to stand and would not seek to 
enforce the CSA against those operating in compliance with state laws.33 
The federal government’s stance on enforcement of the CSA has clearly 
evolved over time. And yet, the ebb and flow of the federal government’s 
enforcement vigor has not changed the fact that the sale of marijuana 
remains illegal at the federal level. 
B.     Colorado’s Marijuana Laws and Federal Preemption 
Despite federal law’s prohibitions on selling marijuana, states 
continue to pass legislation legalizing it under state law. At the time of 
this Article, eight states—Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington—and the District of 
Columbia have passed laws legalizing recreational marijuana sales,34 
 
 29 See Press Release, U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., California’s Top Federal Law Enforcement 
Officials Announce Enforcement Actions Against State’s Widespread and Illegal Marijuana 
Industry (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr100711.html (describing 
“coordinated enforcement actions targeting the illegal operations of the commercial marijuana 
industry in California”). 
 30 See John S. Adams, Medicinal Marijuana Raids in Montana Stun Advocates, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 18, 2011, 12:16 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-03-18-
medmarijuanaraids18_ST_N.htm (reporting twenty-six raids on Montana’s medical marijuana 
facilities across thirteen cities). 
 31 See Medical Marijuana Crackdown in Colorado: 10 More Dispensaries near Schools 
Forced to Shut Down, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2012, 9:50 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/19/medical-marijuana-crackdo_n_1896385.html (noting 
that fifty-seven Colorado medical marijuana dispensaries located near schools had complied 
with orders from U.S. Attorney John Walsh to shut down since January 2012). 
 32 See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 33 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM 
FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 2–3 
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
(suggesting the Department of Justice would not challenge state laws legalizing marijuana 
unless “state enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust to protect against the harms” 
identified as the federal government’s enforcement priorities). 
 34 See supra note 8. The District of Columbia’s marijuana legislation technically does not 
authorize recreational marijuana sales; rather, it permits a person to possess, use, purchase, and 
transport marijuana, but not to transfer it to another person for remuneration. Legalization of 
Possession of Minimal Amounts of Marijuana for Personal Use Initiative of 2014, D.C. Act 20-
565 (Dec. 3, 2014) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-904.01 (West 2001) (effective 
Feb. 26, 2015)), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/33230/B20-1064-SignedAct.pdf. This leaves 
the District of Columbia in a somewhat strange situation, in that it is legal under D.C. law to 
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each beginning with a ballot initiative.35 Colorado’s and Washington’s 
ballot initiatives passed in 2012.36 Alaska’s, the District of Columbia’s, 
and Oregon’s ballot initiatives passed in 2014.37 Successful initiatives in 
California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada followed in 2016.38 Sales 
 
possess, use, and even purchase marijuana for recreational purposes, but it is not legal to sell it. 
See id. § 48-904.01(a)(1).  
 35 For an overview of the ballot initiative process and history, see K.K. DuVivier, State 
Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 228–48 (2005) (describing the history of ballot initiatives and the 
relative benefits and drawbacks of the ballot initiative process). 
 36 See COLO. CONST. amend. 64 (codified as amended at COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16), 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2011-2012/30Final.pdf; 
2012 Colorado Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/
results/ballot-measures/colorado (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM); Initiative Measure No. 
502 (Wash. 2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50, 
46.20, 46.61, 46.04), http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf; 2012 Washington 
Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/ballot-
measures/washington (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM). 
 37 See Ballot Measure No. 2-13PSUM: An Act to Tax and Regulate the Production, Sale, and 
Use of Marijuana, ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS (2014), https://www.elections.alaska.gov/
doc/bml/BM2-13PSUM-ballot-language.pdf; 2014 Alaska Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, 
http://www.politico.com/2014-election/results/map/ballot-measures/alaska (last updated Dec. 
17, 2014, 2:31 PM); Initiative Measure No. 71 (D.C. 2014) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 48-904.01 (2013)), https://www.dcboee.org/pdf_files/pn_1587.pdf; 2014 District of 
Columbia Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2014-election/results/
map/ballot-measures/district-of-columbia (last updated Dec. 17, 2014, 2:31 PM); Measure 91: 
Text of Measure (Or. 2014) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 475B (2015)), http://
www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/documents/measure91.pdf; 2014 Oregon Ballot Measures 
Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2014-election/results/map/ballot-measures/oregon 
(last updated Dec. 17, 2014, 2:31 PM). Though the District of Columbia’s recreational 
marijuana law went into effect in early 2015, an act of Congress effectively blocked the sale and 
taxation of recreational marijuana in the District. See Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 809(a), 128 Stat. 2130, 2394 (“None of the 
Federal funds contained in this Act may be used to enact or carry out any law, rule, or 
regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or 
distribution of any schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act . . . .”); Joseph 
Henchman & Morgan Scarboro, Marijuana Legalization and Taxes: Lessons for Other States 
from Colorado and Washington, TAX FOUND. (May 12, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/
marijuana-legalization-and-taxes-lessons-other-states-colorado-and-washington. However, 
thanks to an order issued in 2016 by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia upholding 
the Local Budget Autonomy Act of 2012, which permits the District to spend its revenues 
without first receiving a congressional appropriation, recreational marijuana sales could be 
possible if the D.C. statute were amended to permit transfers of recreational marijuana for 
remuneration. See Local Budget Autonomy Act of 2012, 60 D.C. Reg. 1724 (July 25, 2013); 
Council of D.C. v. DeWitt, No. 2014 CA 2371 B, 2016 WL 1109117 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 
2016); Chloe Sommers, D.C. Superior Court Clears Hurdle for Legal Marijuana Sales, 
MARIJUANA TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.marijuanatimes.org/d-c-superior-court-clears-
hurdle-for-legal-marijuana-sales; see also supra note 34.  
 38  See Letter from Lance H. Olson, Partner, Olson Hagel & Fishburn L.L.P., to Ashley 
Johansson, Initiative Coordinator, Office of the Attorney Gen. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://
www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0103%20(Marijuana)_1.pdf; 2016 California 
Ballot Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/
map/ballot-measures/california (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM); Marijuana Legalization 
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of retail marijuana began in Colorado in January 2014,39 in Washington 
in July 2014,40 in Oregon in October 2015,41 and in Alaska in October 
2016.42 Licensing of retail marijuana stores is scheduled to begin in 
California in January 2018,43 in Massachusetts in July 2018,44 and in 
Nevada in early 2018.45 There is not yet a target start date for Maine.46 
Many of the issues raised herein apply equally to all of the states that 
have legalized retail marijuana sales, though this Article focuses on just 
one state’s laws to avoid duplicative analysis.47 This Section outlines 
 
Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 2441–2454 (2004), http://www.regulatemaine.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/initiative-text.pdf; 2016 Maine Ballot Measures Election Results, 
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/ballot-measures/maine (last 
updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM); 2016 State Election Question 4: Legalization, Regulation, and 
Taxation of Marijuana, SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://
www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele16/full_text-question-4.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2017); 2016 
Massachusetts Ballot Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-
election/results/map/ballot-measures/massachusetts (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM); 
BARBARA K. CEGAVSKE, SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF NEVADA: STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS 
2016, at 14–17 (2016), http://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=4434; 2016 Nevada Ballot 
Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/
ballot-measures/nevada (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM). 
 39 See Michael Martinez, Colorado’s Recreational Marijuana Stores Make History, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/31/us/colorado-recreational-marijuana (last updated Jan. 1, 2014, 
8:47 PM). 
 40 See Kirk Johnson, Sales of Recreational Marijuana Begin in Washington State, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2014, at A12. 
 41 See Or. Liquor Control Comm’n, Frequently Asked Questions, OREGON.GOV, http://
www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/Pages/Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx#Personal_Use (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2017) (noting that limited quantities of recreational marijuana became available 
for sale by participating medical marijuana dispensaries on October 1, 2015, and that licensing 
of retail stores was scheduled to begin in fall 2016). 
 42 Laurel Andrews, Marijuana Milestone: Alaska’s First Pot Shop Opens to the Public in 
Valdez, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaska-marijuana/2016/
10/29/anticipation-builds-as-alaskas-first-marijuana-store-set-to-open-to-the-public. 
 43 Melia Robinson, Here’s When You Can Start Legally Buying Weed in States that Just 
Legalized It, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/when-
can-you-buy-legal-weed-2016-11. 
 44 David Ingram, Massachusetts Delays Retail Sales of Marijuana Six Months, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 28, 2016, 7:46 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2016/12/28/politics/
massachusetts-delays-retail-sales-of-marijuana-six-months (reporting that Massachusetts 
legislators voted to delay the licensing of retail marijuana stores until July 1, 2018).  
 45 See Retail Marijuana: Frequently Asked Questions, NEV. DEP’T. OF TAX’N., https://
tax.nv.gov/FAQs/Retail_Marijuana (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (stating that the Department of 
Taxation has one year after the law’s January 1, 2017, effective date to implement regulations 
and begin accepting license applications).  
 46 See Robinson, supra note 43 (stating that retail sales in Maine may be delayed “possibly 
for years”). 
 47 This Article examines Colorado’s laws rather than those of the other states that have 
legalized recreational marijuana sales because Colorado was the first state in which retail 
marijuana stores actually opened. Its retail marijuana laws are fairly well developed, in contrast 
to states that have just recently legalized recreational marijuana sales and have not yet 
promulgated regulations (e.g., Maine). The partnership law issues raised below would be 
equally relevant in any of the other states that has legalized recreational marijuana sales, given 
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Colorado’s retail48 marijuana laws and briefly considers whether those 
laws are preempted by the CSA. 
1.     The Colorado State Laws 
The 2012 ballot initiative that amended the Colorado constitution 
to legalize retail marijuana sales added section 16, Personal Use and 
Regulation of Marijuana (Retail Marijuana Amendment),49 to the state’s 
constitution. The Retail Marijuana Amendment makes personal use of 
marijuana legal for persons twenty-one and older and declares an intent 
that marijuana be taxed and regulated in a manner similar to alcohol.50 
Among other things, it legalizes the retail sale of marijuana and requires 
the Colorado Department of Revenue to adopt regulations necessary to 
implement the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s provisions relating to 
retail marijuana sales.51 
 
that each of them (except for Massachusetts) has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) 
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (Uniform Partnership Act (1997)). See Uniform 
Partnership Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 32.06.201–.06.997 (2007); Uniform Partnership Act of 1994, 
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 16100–16962 (West 2014); Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-64-101 to -1206 (West 2006); Uniform Partnership Act of 2010, 
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-601.01 to -611.01 (West 2015); Uniform Partnership Act, ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1001–1105 (2011); Uniform Partnership Act (1997), NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 87.4301–.4357 (West 2005); Oregon Revised Partnership Act, OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 67.005–67.990 (2016); Washington Revised Uniform Partnership Act, WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 25.05.005–.05.907 (2016); see also infra note 138. Accordingly, the partnership act of each 
state that has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) has language pertaining to 
partnership dissolution substantially identical to § 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Colorado Uniform 
Partnership Act (1997), discussed below. See ALASKA STAT. § 32.06.801(4); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 16801(4); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-801(1)(d); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-608.01(4); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1081(4); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.4351(4); OR. REV. STAT. § 67.290(4); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 25.05.300(4); see also infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. Though 
Massachusetts has not adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), its partnership act 
contains the same concept as § 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Colorado Uniform Partnership Act 
(1997). See Uniform Partnership Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 108A, § 31(3) (West 2011) 
(providing for dissolution upon the occurrence of “any event which makes it unlawful for the 
business of the partnership to be carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership”). 
Because all of these states’ partnership acts contain substantially similar language pertaining to 
partnership dissolution, the same problems identified in this Article could arise under any of 
these states’ marijuana laws. See infra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.  
 48 Both medical and recreational marijuana sales have been legalized in Colorado. See 
Colorado Medical Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-43.3-101 to -1102 (West 
2010) (Medical Marijuana Code); Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 12-43.4-101 to -1101 (West 2010). To avoid repetition, this Article focuses primarily upon 
the laws pertaining to retail marijuana. 
 49 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. 
 50 Id. § 16, cl. 1(a), (b), 3–4. 
 51 See id. § 16, cl. 4–5. 
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After the Retail Marijuana Amendment was added to the state 
constitution, the Colorado General Assembly passed the Colorado 
Retail Marijuana Code (Code).52 The Code generally sets out the state 
licensing rules and procedures for businesses that plan to engage in 
retail marijuana sales and empowers a newly created state licensing 
authority (now known as the “Marijuana Enforcement Division,” a 
division of Colorado’s Department of Revenue) to promulgate rules for 
the regulation and control of the retail marijuana business.53 Further, 
the Code makes it unlawful to buy, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer 
retail marijuana except in compliance with the Code and with the Retail 
Marijuana Amendment.54 
Finally, in 2013 the Marijuana Enforcement Division adopted a set 
of rules (Rules)55 regulating the licensing and operation of businesses 
engaged in the retail sale of marijuana as permitted by the Rules, the 
Code, and the Retail Marijuana Amendment (such laws, collectively, the 
“Marijuana Laws,” and such businesses, “Retail Marijuana Businesses”). 
The Rules lay out detailed procedures for applying for retail marijuana 
licenses from the Marijuana Enforcement Division, requirements for 
premises licensed to house Retail Marijuana Businesses’ operations, and 
regulations governing the operation of various types of Retail Marijuana 
Businesses, including stores and cultivation, manufacturing, and testing 
facilities, among other things.56 The Rules also authorize the Marijuana 
Enforcement Division to enforce the Marijuana Laws, including by 
making arrests for violations of those laws.57 
2.     Federal Preemption of the Marijuana Laws 
When states and the federal government regulate the same subject 
matter, the question arises which one takes precedence in the case of 
conflict. This question—the question of preemption—is a complicated 
one as it pertains to whether the CSA preempts the Marijuana Laws.58 
The preemption doctrine arises out of the Constitution’s Supremacy 
 
 52 Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-43.4-101 to -1101. 
 53 See id. §§ 12-43.4-201 to -701. 
 54 Id. § 12-43.4-901(2)(a). 
 55 See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 (2013) (amended 2017). 
 56 See id. §§ 212-2.201 to -712. 
 57 See id. § 212-2.1201. 
 58 As constitutional law is not this Article’s focus, the discussion of preemption herein is 
brief. For an in-depth discussion of the preemption issues described in this Section, see 
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 102–13; Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and 
the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 158–62 
(2012); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y 5, 9–15 (2013) [hereinafter Mikos, Preemption]. 
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Clause, which provides that federal law is the “supreme Law of the 
Land,” such that federal law supersedes conflicting state laws.59 Courts 
have found preemption to occur when Congress includes express 
preemption language within a statute, when “Congress intends federal 
law to occupy the field,” when it is impossible to comply simultaneously 
with both state and federal law, and when the state law frustrates the 
purpose or operation of the federal law.60 Thus, the CSA could preempt 
the Marijuana Laws if it were found that an impermissible “conflict” (in 
any of these senses) exists between the Marijuana Laws and the CSA.61 
Countervailing the preemption doctrine is the Tenth Amendment’s 
anti-commandeering doctrine, which prevents the federal government 
from forcing states to enact laws or requiring state officers to assist in 
enforcing federal laws within the state.62 Under the anti-
commandeering doctrine, “[a] state can constitutionally decide not to 
criminalize conduct under state law even if such conduct offends federal 
law. While states cannot stop the federal government from enforcing 
federal law within their territory, the federal government cannot 
command the state to create a law criminalizing the conduct.”63 
Accordingly, the anti-commandeering doctrine prevents the federal 
government from requiring states to enact or maintain laws that 
criminalize marijuana sales.64 
Section 903 of the CSA contains express language pertaining to 
preemption, providing that the CSA trumps state law in the event of a 
“positive conflict”: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an 
intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that 
provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of 
any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be 
within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict 
between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that 
the two cannot consistently stand together.65 
 
 59 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 60 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 105. 
 61 See id. at 102. 
 62 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997) (noting “state 
legislatures are not subject to federal direction” and rejecting the idea that state officers would 
have to participate actively in implementing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 162 (1992) (“While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, 
including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been 
understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to 
Congress’ instructions.”). 
 63 Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 103. 
 64 Id. at 102–03. 
 65 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
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Some scholars have argued that the CSA does not preempt state 
marijuana laws because section 903’s preemption language is written 
narrowly.66 Among these, leading constitutional law scholar Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky et al. argue that there is no “positive conflict” between 
permissive state laws and the CSA as required for preemption under 
section 903 because 
[i]t is not physically impossible to comply with both the CSA and 
state marijuana laws[, since] nothing in the more liberal state laws 
requires anyone to act contrary to the CSA. Only if a state law 
required a citizen to possess, manufacture, or distribute marijuana in 
violation of federal law would it be impossible for a citizen to comply 
with both state and federal law.67 
Courts that have applied section 903 in challenges to state marijuana 
laws have tended to read it more broadly68 than Chemerinsky et al. do, 
though they have not ruled uniformly either for or against 
preemption.69 This lack of uniformity reflects the fact that the Supreme 
 
 66 See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 107 (“[T]he CSA does not preempt more 
lenient state marijuana laws because such state laws are consistent with the CSA’s purposes and 
objectives.”); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423–24 (2009) (“States 
may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress has not preempted—and more 
importantly, may not preempt—state laws that merely permit (i.e., refuse to punish) private 
conduct the federal government deems objectionable.”) 
 67 Chemerinsky et al., supra note 9, at 106. 
 68 See Mikos, Preemption, supra note 58, at 13–15 (observing instances in which courts 
struck down state marijuana laws based on an assumption that Congress intended the CSA to 
preempt all conflicts). 
 69 Cases in which courts found the CSA preempted state marijuana laws include People v. 
Crouse, 2017 CO 5, ¶ 8 (state medical marijuana law requiring law enforcement officials to 
return seized medical marijuana to patients was preempted because of a positive conflict with 
the CSA); Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1230 (D.N.M. 2016) (finding state 
medical marijuana laws did not compel employer to accommodate employee’s medical 
marijuana use because of conflict with the CSA); Forest City Residential Management ex rel. 
Plymouth Square Dividend Housing Ass’n v. Beasley, 71 F. Supp. 3d 715, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2014) 
(state medical marijuana statute conflicted with CSA and was therefore preempted); Montana 
Caregivers Ass’n v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1148 (D. Mont. 2012), aff’d, 526 F. 
App’x 756 (9th Cir. 2013) (medical marijuana raid was not unconstitutional because CSA 
trumped state medical marijuana statute); and Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of 
Labor & Industries, 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or. 2010) (state statute affirmatively authorizing medical 
marijuana use was preempted as an obstacle to the implementation of the CSA’s purposes and 
objectives). Courts finding no preemption include In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs West Ltd., 484 
B.R. 799, 805 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) (finding no preemption of the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment or the section of Colorado’s constitution authorizing medical marijuana use 
because “both make it clear that their provisions apply to state law only” and “[a]bsent from 
either enactment is any effort to impede the enforcement of federal law” (footnote omitted) 
(citation omitted)); Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 347 P.3d 136, 141 (Ariz. 2015) (finding no 
preemption of state medical marijuana statute by the CSA for lack of a positive conflict and 
commenting that “the CSA does not expressly preempt state drug laws or exclusively govern 
the field”); Kirby v. County of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 832 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied, 
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Court has not yet spoken definitively on this issue.70 The Court’s 
ultimate ruling on the CSA’s preemptive power is somewhat difficult to 
predict.71 
In light of the uncertainties regarding the CSA’s preemptive 
power—and for the sake of argument—this Article assumes that the 
CSA does not preempt the Marijuana Laws. That is to say, this Article 
assumes that the use and sale of marijuana in accordance with the 
Marijuana Laws is legal under Colorado state law but illegal under 
federal law. 
 
(Ct. App. 2016) (state statute preventing arrest of medical marijuana users with a qualifying 
identification card for certain medical marijuana-related activities was not preempted by the 
CSA); and Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Mich. 2014) (state medical 
marijuana statute was not preempted because there was no positive conflict with the CSA).  
 70 The Supreme Court has touched upon the CSA’s preemptive power in Gonzales v. Raich, 
in which the Court held that the CSA was a valid use of Congress’s power to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause, even as applied to use of medical marijuana that was permitted under 
California law. 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). Some courts have relied upon Raich in suggesting that the 
CSA generally preempts state law regulating marijuana. See, e.g., United States v. McWilliams, 
138 F. App’x 1, 2 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating Raich forecloses the argument that compliance with 
state medical marijuana act provides a shield against criminal liability under the CSA and 
suggesting the CSA preempts state law); United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 
1100 (D. Mont. 2012), adhered to on reconsideration, No. CR 11-61-M-DLC, 2012 WL 4602838 
(D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012) (stating that, after Raich, “under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution there is no viable Tenth Amendment claim based on federal prosecution of 
marijuana distribution activity that is legal under state law”). Yet the Court in Raich did not 
expressly state that the California law was preempted; based on this, other courts have declined 
to interpret Raich as standing for the proposition that the CSA preempts state marijuana laws. 
Accord County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal. App. 4th 798, 825 (Ct. App. 2008); 
see White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 386 P.3d 416, 429 n.18 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2016) (“Raich addressed whether the CSA's criminalization of marijuana . . . was 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause, not whether state laws permitting medical 
marijuana were preempted by the CSA.”); City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 656, 673 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1044 (2008) (noting the sole issue in 
Raich was not preemption, but rather “whether Congress had the constitutional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the manufacture and possession of marijuana”); see 
also Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1490 (2006) (observing that the Supreme Court did not invalidate 
California’s marijuana laws on preemption or other grounds); Mikos, Preemption, supra note 
58, at 101 (noting the Supreme Court has not yet opined upon whether the CSA preempts state 
marijuana laws). Further muddling the debate, the Supreme Court also cautioned in Printz v. 
United States that the anti-commandeering rule is limited in scope, observing that it does not 
eliminate state officials’ duty “to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as not to 
obstruct the operation of federal law.” 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997). 
 71 See David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal 
Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 625 (2013) (“[I]t is far from clear that a 
majority of the Supreme Court will redefine anti-commandeering doctrine at the expense of 
preemption in order to save state marijuana legalization laws.”). 
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C.     Application of the Marijuana Laws to Partnerships 
With this understanding of the Marijuana Laws in place, the next 
question is why those laws matter to partnerships. Quite simply, the 
Marijuana Laws matter to partnerships because the laws implicitly 
authorize partnerships to participate in the Retail Marijuana Business. 
The Retail Marijuana Amendment declares it not unlawful to do, among 
many other things, the following: purchase marijuana from a 
“marijuana cultivation facility” or “marijuana product manufacturing 
facility”;72 sell marijuana to consumers pursuant to a valid license to 
operate a “retail marijuana store”;73 deliver or transfer marijuana to a 
“marijuana testing facility”;74 or sell marijuana to a “marijuana 
cultivation facility, a marijuana product manufacturing facility, or a 
retail marijuana store” pursuant to a valid license to operate a 
“marijuana cultivation facility.”75 Each of these terms is defined in the 
Retail Marijuana Amendment’s definitions section, and each definition 
begins with the phrase “means an entity”—as in, “‘Marijuana testing 
facility’ means an entity licensed to analyze and certify the safety and 
potency of marijuana.”76 “Entity” is not itself a defined term in the Retail 
Marijuana Amendment.77 But, both according to the ordinary meaning 
of the term,78 and also specifically under the Colorado Uniform 
Partnership Act (1997) (Partnership Act)79 and the Colorado 
Corporations and Associations Act,80 a general partnership or limited 
liability partnership (LLP) is an “entity.”81 Therefore, since the Retail 
 
 72 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 4(b). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. § 16, cl. 4(c). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. § 16, cl. 2(l) (emphasis added). 
 77 See id. § 16, cl. 2 (definitions section). 
 78 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “entity” as “[a]n organization (such as a business or a 
governmental unit) that has a legal identity apart from its members or owners.” Entity, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Partnerships under the Colorado Uniform Partnership Act 
(1997) clearly fit within this definition. 
 79 Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-64-101 to -1206 
(West 2006). 
 80 Colorado Corporations and Associations Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-90-101 to  
-1005 (West 2006). 
 81 Section 7-64-201 of the Partnership Act provides “[a] partnership is an entity distinct 
from its partners.” § 7-64-201. “Partnership,” as used here, refers to both general and limited 
liability partnerships: the Partnership Act’s definitions section defines “partnership” by 
reference to the meaning set forth in section 7-64-202(1), which in turn provides, in relevant 
part, that “[a] limited liability partnership is for all purposes a partnership.” Id. §§ 7-64-
101(19), -202(1). Section 7-90-102(20) of the Colorado Corporations and Associations Act 
defines “entity” as “a domestic entity or a foreign entity.” Id. § 7-90-102(20). The term 
“domestic entity” is defined to include, in relevant part, “a domestic general partnership.” Id. 
§ 7-90-102(13). 
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Marijuana Amendment contemplates that the various marijuana-related 
activities listed therein will be engaged in by “entities,” the amendment 
permits general partnerships and LLPs—as “entities”—to engage in 
those activities. 
While the Retail Marijuana Amendment implicitly refers to 
partnerships in its definitions that use the term “entity,” the Code does 
so explicitly by means of various definitions and operative provisions 
contemplating actions by “persons.” For instance, the Code provides 
that the state will issue licenses to various “persons”—including retail 
marijuana stores, retail marijuana cultivation facilities, retail marijuana 
products manufacturers, and retail marijuana testing facilities—for the 
purpose of cultivating, manufacturing, distributing, selling, and testing 
retail marijuana and related products.82 “Person” is defined, in relevant 
part, as “a natural person, partnership, association, company, 
corporation, limited liability company, or organization.”83 Accordingly, 
the Code provides that partnerships are one type of “person” that may 
engage in the Retail Marijuana Business pursuant to the Retail 
Marijuana Amendment and the Code (such a partnership, a “Retail 
Marijuana Partnership”). 
The Rules implicate partnerships in much the same way as do the 
Retail Marijuana Amendment and the Code, and also discuss 
partnerships explicitly. Like the Retail Marijuana Amendment, the Rules 
define each of the various retail marijuana businesses—retail marijuana 
cultivation facilities, retail marijuana products manufacturing facilities, 
and retail marijuana stores—as an “entity.”84 This means a partnership 
could operate any of these retail marijuana businesses under the Rules, 
since the term “entity” comprises partnerships. Further, like the Code, 
the Rules include partnerships in the definition of “Person.”85 This term 
is relevant because the Rules also define an “Applicant” for a retail 
marijuana license under the Rules and a “Licensee” holding a retail 
 
 82 See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-401(1) (2010). 
Additionally, a “licensee” is “a person licensed or registered pursuant to [the Code].” Id. § 12-
43.4-103(5) (emphasis added). “Retail marijuana cultivation facility,” “retail marijuana 
products manufacturer,” “retail marijuana store,” and “retail marijuana testing facility” are all 
defined in section 12-43.4-103 of the Code by reference to their corresponding terms in the 
Retail Marijuana Amendment. See id. § 12-43.4-103(16), (19), (20), (21); COLO. CONST. art. 
XVIII, § 16, cl. 2(h), (j), (l), (n); see also supra text accompanying note 76. 
 83 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-103(13) (emphasis added). 
 84 See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.103 (2013) (amended 2017). 
Unlike the Retail Marijuana Amendment, the Rules define “Retail Marijuana Testing Facility” 
as a “public or private laboratory,” rather than an “entity.” See id. 
 85 Id. (defining “Person,” in relevant part, as “a natural person, partnership, association, 
company, corporation, limited liability company, or organization” (emphasis added)). 
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marijuana license under the Code as a “Person.”86 Putting this together, 
a partnership is a “Person” that could be an “Applicant” or a “Licensee” 
under the Rules. Moreover, the intent to permit partnerships to engage 
in the Retail Marijuana Business is clear in several of the Rules that 
expressly refer to general partnerships, LLPs, and limited partnerships 
(LPs) as “Closely Held Business Entit[ies]” that may be “Applicants” for 
retail marijuana licenses.87 In sum, all of the Marijuana Laws are 
consistent in that they permit partnerships88 to engage in the Retail 
Marijuana Business. 
 
 86 See id. (defining “Applicant” as “a Person that has submitted an application for licensure 
or registration, or for renewal of licensure or registration, pursuant to [the Rules] that was 
accepted by the Division for review but has not been approved or denied by the State Licensing 
Authority” and “Licensee” as “any Person licensed or registered pursuant to the [Code]”). 
 87 See id. § 212-2.201(A)(4)(e)(iii)(D), 205(C). The Rules define “Closely Held Business 
Entity” as an “entity” under section 7-90-102 of the Colorado Corporations and Associations 
Act that has no more than fifteen owners, each of whom is a natural person and a U.S. citizen, 
and each of whom has an “Associated Key License,” as defined in the Rules. Id. § 212-2.103; see 
supra note 81 regarding the definition of “entity” under the Colorado Corporations and 
Associations Act. 
 88 As a technical matter, it should be noted that “partnership,” as used in section 12-43.4-
103(13) of the Code and rule 103 of the Rules, almost certainly includes LPs, though nowhere 
in the Marijuana Laws is the term “partnership” expressly defined. See COLO. CONST. art. 
XVIII, § 16, cl. 2 (definitions); Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-
103 (same); Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.103 (same). The term 
“partnership” as used in the Partnership Act includes only those partnerships that are formed 
under title 7, articles 60 or 64 of the Colorado Revised Statutes and comparable statutes of other 
jurisdictions—i.e., the statutes governing general and limited liability partnerships. See 
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-202(2) (“[A]n association 
is not a partnership under this article if it is formed under a statute other than: (a) [Article 64]; 
(b) Article 60 of this title; or (c) A comparable statute of another jurisdiction.”). Thus, an LP is 
not a “partnership” under the Partnership Act. This exclusion in the Partnership Act is clearly 
intentional. The second sentence of section 7-60-106(2) of the Partnership Act’s predecessor 
statute, Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law, provides that article 60 “appl[ies] to limited 
partnerships except insofar as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent 
herewith.” Uniform Partnership Law, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-106(2) (1963). Yet section 7-64-
202(2)(c) of the Partnership Act, which is the more recent statute, provides that “[a] 
partnership that is subject to article 60 of this title by reason of the first sentence of subsection 
(2) of section 7-60-106 shall be deemed to be formed under article 60 for purposes of this 
subsection (2).” § 7-64-202(2)(c) (emphasis added). In other words, LPs—which are subject to 
Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law only by operation of the second sentence of section 7-60-
106(2)—are not “partnerships” under the Partnership Act. But given the broad and inclusive 
definition of “person” in the Code and in the Rules, it seems unlikely that the drafters intended 
to exclude LPs from the definition of “person” by not referring to them expressly. It is more 
plausible that the word “partnership” in this definition is intended to include all forms of 
partnerships recognized under Colorado law, including general partnerships, LLPs, and LPs. 
(Colorado also recognizes limited liability limited partnerships, which are omitted in this 
discussion to avoid unnecessary complication. See § 7-64-1002(1) (providing for registration of 
limited liability limited partnerships).) Bolstering the argument that the term “partnership” in 
the Code and the Rules includes LPs, the Rules specifically mention LPs as a type of entity that 
may be an “Applicant” thereunder. See § 212-2.205(C) (“If the Applicant for any license 
pursuant to the Retail Code is a general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability 
partnership . . . .”). Even if a court did construe the term “partnership” in the Code’s and Rules’ 
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II.     PARTNERSHIP FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION 
To understand why the Marijuana Laws create problems for 
partnerships, it is important to understand the relevant Colorado laws 
governing partnerships, particularly—for this Article—with respect to 
partnership formation and dissolution. Colorado partnerships are 
governed by one of two partnership statutes. Partnerships89 formed 
prior to January 1, 1998, are governed by Colorado’s Uniform 
Partnership Law (Uniform Partnership Law).90 Partnerships91 formed 
after January 1, 1998, or those electing to be so covered, are governed by 
the Partnership Act.92 This Article focuses upon the more recent statute, 
since new partnerships formed to engage in the Retail Marijuana 
Business would be subject to its provisions. 
This Part first describes the formation of partnerships under the 
Partnership Act and then explains their dissolution under that statute. 
Next, it argues that, although the Marijuana Laws authorize 
partnerships to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business, partnerships 
legally cannot do so because partnership common law prevents them 
from forming for that purpose and because the Partnership Act would 
cause them to dissolve automatically if they were formed for that 
purpose. Finally, this Part presents three interpretations of Colorado law 
that, if adopted by a court, would avoid mandatory dissolution of Retail 
Marijuana Partnerships. It then concludes that a Colorado court would 
be unlikely to adopt these interpretations. 
 
definitions of “person” to exclude LPs because of the definition of “partnership” in the 
Partnership Act (which seems unlikely), an LP could plausibly fall under the catch-all category 
of an “organization” and be considered a “person” in that way. See §§ 12-43.4-103(13), 212-
2.103 (including “organization” in the definition of “Person”). 
 89 As used here, “partnerships” includes LLPs, as Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law also 
governs LLPs formed prior to January 1, 1998. See §§ 7-60-144 to -154 (provisions governing 
LLPs). Section 7-60-106 of Colorado’s Uniform Partnership Law makes clear that an LLP is a 
“partnership” for purposes of such law. Id. § 7-60-106 (“A partnership . . . includes, without 
limitation, a limited liability partnership.”). 
 90 §§ 7-60-101 to -154; see § 7-64-1205(1) (stating that the Partnership Act only governs 
partnerships formed after January 1, 1998, unless a partnership formed earlier elects to be 
governed by the Partnership Act pursuant to section 7-64-1205(2) thereof, or a partnership 
formed after that date is continuing the business of a partnership that dissolved pursuant to 
section 7-60-141 of the Uniform Partnership Law). 
 91 Again, this includes both general and limited liability partnerships. See supra note 81. 
 92 § 7-64-1205(1). 
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A.     Formation 
It is relatively simple to form a partnership. In Colorado, “the 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business 
for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to 
form a partnership.”93 As this implies, there is no statutorily required 
state filing necessary to form a general partnership, unless the 
partnership will be operated under a trade name.94 The persons wishing 
to form a partnership may simply start operating as one (assuming they 
will not conduct business under a trade name), with or without a 
written contract governing their relationship, otherwise known as a 
partnership agreement.95 To form an LLP, an association meeting the 
requirements for a general partnership need only file with the secretary 
of state a statement of registration containing the statutorily prescribed 
information.96 
However, the formation of partnerships is not entirely without 
constraints. Relevant here, partnerships cannot be formed for an illegal 
purpose, or for a lawful purpose that will be pursued in an unlawful 
way.97 Moreover, courts will not enforce partnership agreements 
 
 93 Id. § 7-64-202(1). The second clause of this provision reflects the fact that partnerships 
may be implied by law when the parties’ acts meet the statutory definition of a partnership. See 
Yoder v. Hooper, 695 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Colo. App. 1984), aff’d, 737 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1987); see 
also Grau v. Mitchell, 397 P.2d 488, 489 (Colo. 1964) (en banc) (defining partnership as a 
“contract, express or implied, between two or more competent persons to place their money, 
effects, labor or skill . . . into a business” (emphasis added)). “Business” is defined broadly to 
“include[] every trade, occupation, and profession.” § 7-64-101(2). The Retail Marijuana 
Business would clearly fall within the term “business.” 
 94 The Colorado Revised Statutes require the filing of a statement of trade name with the 
secretary of state if a general partnership transacting business in Colorado will be operating 
under any name other than the true name of each of the partnership’s partners. COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 7-71-101, -103 (2004) (effective May 30, 2006). To avoid undue complication, this 
Article overlooks the related fees, licenses, etc. that may be required for the operation of various 
partnerships. 
 95 See Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-101(20) 
(West 2006) (defining “Partnership agreement” as “the agreement, whether written, oral, or 
implied, among the partners that governs relations among the partners and between the 
partners and the partnership”); see also W. Gas Processors, Ltd. v. Enron Gas Processing Co., 
CIV.A. No. 87-A-1472, 1988 WL 73307, at *24 (D. Colo. July 7, 1988) (referring to a 
partnership agreement as a “contract”). 
 96 § 7-64-1002(1), (3). The information required in a statement of registration includes the 
partnership’s name, the address of its principal office, and the name and address of its 
registered agent. Id. § 7-64-1002(3). See supra notes 81, 88 for a discussion of LLPs as 
partnerships. 
 97 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 53 (2016) (“A partnership formed for illegal purposes or 
to pursue a lawful purpose in an unlawful manner is invalid and unenforceable.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see Mann v. Friden, 287 P.2d 961, 964 (Colo. 1955) (en banc) (“A partnership can 
only be created by a contract of the parties and that contract is one whereby they agree to place 
their money, effects, labor and skill in a lawful business . . . .” (emphasis added)). In fact, 
 
NEWELL.38.4.3 (Do Not Delete) 4/13/2017  9:09 AM 
1362 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:1343 
 
pertaining to partnerships formed for an illegal purpose, and generally 
decline to aid the parties in actions arising out of such partnerships.98 
This Article refers to this doctrine as the “illegal purpose doctrine.” 
 
associations of two or more persons to carry out an illegal purpose may constitute conspiracies. 
See Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, 270 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1954) (en banc) (elements of 
civil conspiracy under Colorado law are “(1) two or more persons . . . ; (2) an object to be 
accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more 
unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof”); Denver Jobbers’ Ass’n v. 
People, 21 Colo. App. 326, 370 (1912) (“A combination of two or more persons to effect an 
illegal purpose, either by legal or illegal means . . . is a common-law conspiracy.” (quoting State 
v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 286 (1887))). 
 98 See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 670 (1899) (refusing to grant relief to a partner 
in a partnership formed for the purpose of performing construction work won by the partners’ 
submitting separate, fictitious bids). As to the partnership agreement, the McMullen Court 
stated the following: 
[N]o court will lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an 
illegal contract. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove the 
illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it, nor will 
they enforce any alleged rights directly springing from such contract. 
Id. at 654; see also Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kennedy, 20 P. 696, 698–99 (Colo. 1889) (accounting 
and other relief refused for a partner invested in a quarry partnership that operated in violation 
of the U.S. homestead statutes on the ground that the partnership was invalid, noting where 
“both parties were to partake of the fruits to be derived from an act to be done in violation of 
[the] law. . . . and the same is made to appear to a court of justice in an action brought to 
enforce the contract, the court simply leaves the parties where it finds them, and refuses any 
relief”); cf. Sender v. Simon, 84 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding a partnership 
agreement for a limited partnership an illegal contract and refusing to enforce it “based upon 
‘the elementary principle that one who has himself participated in a violation of law cannot be 
permitted to assert in a court of justice any right founded upon or growing out of the illegal 
transaction’” (quoting Merrill v. Abbott, 77 B.R. 843, 857 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987))). However, if 
it is possible to sever the illegal portion of a partnership agreement from the legal portion, 
courts may do so and enforce the legal portion. See Union Pac. Ry. Co., 20 P. at 698 (observing 
that, if the legal part of a contract for a joint adventure “could be separated from the illegal part, 
then it might, perhaps, be considered as two contracts, and the legal contract enforced”). 
Additionally, a Colorado court’s willingness to enforce a partnership agreement for a Retail 
Marijuana Partnership may be influenced by a section of the Colorado Revised Statutes that 
declares that “[i]t is the public policy of the state of Colorado that a contract is not void or 
voidable as against public policy if it pertains to lawful activities authorized by” the Retail 
Marijuana Amendment and the Code. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-601 (West 2014). Before 
concluding that a Colorado court would enforce a partnership agreement for a Retail Marijuana 
Partnership on the basis of this provision, it is important to distinguish between illegality and 
violation of public policy. Both are grounds for refusal to enforce a contract. See Waddell v. 
Traylor, 64 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Colo. 1937) (en banc) (“Courts will not lend their aid to the 
enforcement of terms of a contract which will result in the consummation of a criminal act, or 
one contrary to the public policy of the state.”). However, they are distinct grounds. Not all 
conduct that violates public policy is illegal. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has held 
that a waiver of attorney’s fees in a marital agreement would violate public policy and be 
unenforceable if one spouse lacked the financial resources to litigate the dissolution of the 
marriage. In re Marriage of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo. 2007) (en banc). Yet such an 
agreement to waive attorney’s fees is not illegal; it is not a criminal act or otherwise in violation 
of applicable law. Retail marijuana sales pose a different problem: they are illegal, as a criminal 
violation of the CSA. And so, while section 13-22-601 would prevent a court from voiding a 
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B.     Dissolution 
Formation is the beginning of the partnership, and dissolution is 
the beginning of its end. Dissolution is a technical concept referring to a 
change in the relation of the partners that ends a partnership’s legal 
existence as a partnership.99 Dissolution triggers the winding up 
process;100 once dissolution occurs, the partnership continues only to 
wind up its business.101 Winding up involves selling off the partnership’s 
assets, settling accounts, and distributing proceeds to the partners.102 
Once the winding up process is complete, the partnership is 
terminated.103 
The Partnership Act specifies various causes of dissolution.104 
Among these causes is “[a]n event that makes it unlawful for all or 
substantially all of the business of the partnership to be continued” 
unless such illegality is cured within ninety days after the partnership 
has notice of the event.105 Dissolution under this provision is mandatory 
and automatic;106 the Partnership Act does not merely provide a right 
for the partners to elect to dissolve in the face of unlawful activity or to 
petition a court to order dissolution for illegality.107 Moreover, the 
mandatory dissolution provision cannot be waived or varied by 
agreement of the partners.108 This means that once it becomes unlawful 
 
contract pertaining to retail marijuana because it violates Colorado’s public policy, this section 
does not have the power to prevent such a contract from being voidable as illegal. 
 99 See 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 539 (2016). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-802(1) (West 
2006). The Partnership Act does, however, provide a means whereby partners may waive the 
right to terminate the partnership and have its business wound up, in which case the 
partnership carries on as if dissolution had never happened. See id. § 7-64-802(2). 
 102 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 539 (2016). 
 103 § 7-64-802(1). 
 104 See id. § 7-64-801(1). 
 105 Id. § 7-64-801(1)(d). 
 106 See id. § 7-64-801(1) (“A partnership is dissolved, and its business shall be wound up, 
only upon the occurrence of any of the following events . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 107 However, section 7-64-801(1)(e) of the Partnership Act does permit partners to apply to 
the court for dissolution on various grounds, including that “[t]he economic purpose of the 
partnership is likely to be unreasonably frustrated” and “[i]t is not otherwise reasonably 
practicable to carry on the partnership business in conformity with the partnership agreement.” 
Id. §§ 7-64-801(1)(e)(I), (III). If the partnership’s business became unlawful, a partner could 
presumably petition the court to order dissolution under one of these provisions. 
 108 See id. § 7-64-103(2) (“The partnership agreement may not . . . [v]ary the requirement to 
wind up the partnership business in cases specified in section 7-64-801(1)(d) . . . .”). Because 
“partnership agreement” is defined broadly, any agreement among the partners would 
constitute a “partnership agreement.” See supra note 95. 
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for a partnership’s business to be continued the partnership dissolves 
and must, unavoidably, wind up.109 
C.     Interplay Between the Laws and the Problems Created 
With the foregoing partnership law background in mind, this 
Section argues that Colorado’s legalizing retail marijuana sales by means 
of the Marijuana Laws has unintended consequences for partnerships 
because selling marijuana remains illegal under federal law. Specifically, 
it contends that partnerships cannot legally form to engage in the Retail 
Marijuana Business and that, if they were able to form for that purpose, 
they would automatically dissolve. 
1.     Formation 
As noted earlier, partnership common law provides that 
partnerships cannot be formed for an illegal purpose.110 Thus, if the 
Retail Marijuana Business is “illegal,” it follows logically that 
partnerships cannot be formed to engage in this business. A prospective 
partner in a Retail Marijuana Partnership might argue that a partnership 
is not formed for an illegal purpose if its business purpose is authorized 
under state law, regardless of whether this purpose is a violation of 
 
 109 It is worth noting that the situation would be different under the most recent version of 
the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), a prior version of which was the basis for the Partnership 
Act. See infra note 138. The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) was amended in 2013 to reflect 
efforts to harmonize all the uniform acts for unincorporated organizations. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 6 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015) (prefatory note to 2011 and 2013 harmonization amendments), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Partnership/UPA%20_Final_2014_2015aug19.pdf. 
Among the harmonizing amendments were changes to section 801 of the Uniform Partnership 
Act (1997), the dissolution section. In relevant part, the amended section 801 reads as follows: 
A partnership is dissolved, and its business must be wound up, upon the occurrence 
of any of the following: . . .  
(4) on application by a partner, the entry, by [the appropriate court] of an order 
dissolving the partnership on the grounds that: 
 (A) the conduct of all or substantially all the partnership’s business is unlawful . . . . 
Id. § 801. If the Partnership Act were amended to reflect this language, there would be little 
problem in practice with respect to partnership dissolution under Colorado’s current marijuana 
regulatory regime. See infra text accompanying notes 128–40. It is unlikely that a partner in a 
Retail Marijuana Partnership would request a court order for dissolution on the grounds that 
its business is “unlawful”—unless, of course, there were a falling out among the partners and 
one partner were seeking dissolution under this provision because it could not be obtained by 
other means. And if this were to happen, it is possible that the court might disallow the 
dissolution application on the grounds of bad faith on the part of the complaining partner. 
 110 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
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federal law.111 However, this argument does not comport with the 
generally understood meaning of “illegal.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines illegal as “[f]orbidden by law; unlawful.”112 Similarly, the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines it as “[n]ot legal or lawful; contrary to, or 
forbidden by, law.”113 Cases involving the illegal purpose doctrine have 
not adopted a meaning of “illegal” other than its ordinary meaning.114 
And, according to this plain meaning, the Retail Marijuana Business is 
“illegal” because federal law forbids it. 
Nonetheless, a court could interpret the illegal purpose doctrine as 
permitting partnerships to form for a purpose authorized under state 
law, even if it is illegal under federal law. Though this is theoretically 
possible, nothing in the jurisprudence suggests that a court would do 
such a thing.115 Cases that contemplate formation of partnerships for an 
illegal purpose do not tend to analyze the distinction between illegality 
under state versus federal law.116 Moreover, in a different context, the 
Colorado Supreme Court has declined to declare marijuana use “lawful” 
for purposes of a state statute because it remains prohibited under 
federal law.117 Even in states in which the sale of marijuana (for medical 
or recreational purposes) has been legalized under state law, the courts 
remain cognizant of the fact that selling marijuana remains “illegal” 
under federal law.118 Accordingly, the illegal purpose doctrine should 
 
 111 See also infra text accompanying notes 167–76. 
 112 Illegal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 113 Illegal, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 114 See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kennedy, 20 P. 696, 697 (Colo. 1889) (partnership 
agreement was illegal as in violation of the U.S. homestead statutes); Morelli v. Ehsan, 756 P.2d 
129, 132 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (partnership agreement was illegal under state statutes barring 
the practice of medicine by unlicensed persons). 
 115 In cases involving the illegal purpose doctrine it is often unnecessary for the court to 
consider both state and federal law because the business purpose at issue is clearly prohibited 
under a state statute. See, e.g., Monar v. Hurt, 791 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(partnership formed to operate gambling devices at bars and taverns was illegal under Indiana 
statutes); Nahas v. George, 99 N.E.2d 898, 901 (Ohio 1951) (partnership’s business of selling 
alcohol was in violation of the express provisions of the Ohio statute); Morelli, 756 P.2d at 132 
(partnership to operate a medical clinic was illegal under Washington statutes barring the 
practice of medicine by unlicensed persons because it included a non-physician partner). 
 116 E.g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 649 (1899) (finding agreements to make 
fraudulent bids for contracting work “illegal in their nature and tendency”); Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 
229 F.2d 248, 255–56 (2d Cir. 1956) (partnership formed to import liquor into the United States 
in violation of the Constitution’s Prohibition Amendment was illegal); Johnston v. Senecal, 109 
N.E.2d 467, 467–68 (Mass. 1952) (finding a partnership purpose of entertaining public officials 
to be illegal as a matter of public policy); Nahas, 99 N.E.2d at 901 (finding a purpose of selling 
alcohol without a liquor permit to be illegal under Ohio statutes and public policy). 
 117 See infra text accompanying notes 152–55. 
 118 E.g., Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008) (“No state law 
could completely legalize marijuana for medical purposes because the drug remains illegal 
under federal law, even for medical users.” (citations omitted)); People v. Crouse, 2017 CO 5, 
¶ 2 (“Distribution of marijuana . . . remains unlawful under federal law.”). 
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prevent Retail Marijuana Partnerships from forming as legally 
cognizable entities. 
An issue that bears on whether a partnership formed to engage in 
the Retail Marijuana Business is legally cognizable is whether the state 
recognizes its formation. Such recognition could be administrative, for 
example, by accepting a filed trade name registration, or judicial, by 
enforcing rights under a partnership agreement or otherwise granting 
relief to the partnership and/or the partners. Either form of recognition 
would clearly appear to sanction Retail Marijuana Partnerships and 
imply that Colorado does recognize their formation, despite their being 
formed for an illegal purpose.119 
This question of state recognition is particularly relevant for LLPs, 
since LLPs require the delivery of a statement of registration to the 
secretary of state.120 After a qualifying statement of registration is 
 
 119 A similar concern comes up in the context of taxation—that is, does acceptance of a tax 
return from a business engaged in the marijuana trade constitute recognition of that business as 
a legitimate enterprise? The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is able to avoid this quagmire in 
part because section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines “gross income,” does 
not “differentiate between income derived from legal sources and income derived from illegal 
sources.” I.R.S. Chief Counsel Memorandum 201504011 from Matthew A. Houtsma, Associate 
Area Counsel to W. Thomas McElroy, Jr. (Jan. 23, 2015) [hereinafter I.R.S. Chief Counsel 
Memorandum 201504011], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/201504011.pdf (citing James v. 
United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961)); I.R.C. § 61(a) (2017). This means the IRS can collect 
federal income tax on the taxable income of a marijuana business while still acknowledging that 
the business is illegal under federal law. See I.R.S. Chief Counsel Memorandum 201504011, 
supra. Some other jurisdictions incorporate language in their tax documents that seeks to avoid 
the appearance of sanctioning illegal enterprises. For example, the City of San José, California 
Marijuana Business Tax Return specifies that paying the required municipal tax on marijuana 
businesses “does not authorize unlawful business.” CITY OF SAN JOSE FIN. DEP’T., MARIJUANA 
BUSINESS TAX RETURN (2013), https://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1280. Of 
course, those who file tax returns for businesses that are illegal under federal law put themselves 
at risk of criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Mick, 263 F.3d 553, 567 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(federal income tax returns were admissible evidence in bookmaker’s criminal prosecution). 
 120 The same problem arises for other types of business entities, including LPs, limited 
liability companies (LLCs), and corporations, as all of these are required to file organizational 
documents with the state—i.e., their formation requires some state action. See Colorado 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1981, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-62-201(1) (West 2006) 
(effective 1981) (certificate of limited partnership); Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-204(1) (effective 1990) (LLC articles of organization); Colorado 
Business Corporation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-102-102(2)(b)(I) (effective Aug. 5, 2008) 
(articles of incorporation). This again raises the question of whether acknowledging their 
registration sanctions a business that remains illegal under federal law, and whether this 
sanction has any meaningful consequences. The other wrinkle related to filing organizational 
documents is the potential inclusion of a statement of purpose in those documents—
specifically, including as the entities’ stated purpose engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business. 
None of these entities’ filings requires a statement of purpose. See § 7-62-201(1) (mandatory 
contents of a certificate of limited partnership do not include a statement of purpose); § 7-80-
204(1) (mandatory contents of an LLC’s articles of organization do not include a statement of 
purpose); § 7-102-102(2)(b)(I) (“The articles of incorporation may but need not state: . . . [t]he 
purpose or purposes for which the corporation is incorporated . . . .”). Neither does an LLP’s 
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delivered to the secretary, the secretary files it.121 This filing is 
“conclusive” evidence that “all conditions precedent to registration” as 
an LLP have been met.122 Thus, unlike formation of general 
partnerships, LLP formation requires state action. And, arguably, if the 
secretary of state files the statement of registration, the state has 
sanctioned the LLP’s formation.123 
Does a Retail Marijuana Partnership’s legal existence truly depend 
upon whether the state has filed paperwork on that partnership’s behalf? 
Probably not—at least not for purposes of determining the rights of 
third parties in dealing with that partnership. The very way in which 
 
statement of registration require a statement of purpose. See Colorado Uniform Partnership 
Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-1002(3) (West 2006) (listing the mandatory contents 
of an LLP’s statement of registration). But organizers of an LP, LLC, or corporation could 
choose to include a statement of purpose in their filings. See § 7-62-201(1)(e) (certificate of 
limited partnership shall state “[a]ny other matters relating to the limited partnership or the 
certificate the general partners determine to include therein”); § 7-80-204(1)(h) (LLC articles of 
organization shall state “[a]ny other matters relating to the limited liability company or the 
articles of organization the persons forming the limited liability company determine to include 
therein”); § 7-102-102(2)(b)(I) (“[A]rticles of incorporation may but need not state: . . . [t]he 
purpose or purposes for which the corporation is incorporated . . . .”). In contrast, the LLP 
statement of registration does not permit inclusion of optional information. See § 7-64-1002(3). 
An organizer who chooses to include in the filed organizational documents that the purpose of 
the entity is to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business runs the risk of drawing attention to the 
prohibition against formation for an illegal purpose (not to mention being engaged in a 
business prohibited under federal law). Even a statement that the purpose of the entity is to 
engage in any lawful act or activity for which such entity may be organized under the relevant 
state entity law (a common formulation) could be problematic, given that the Retail Marijuana 
Business is illegal under federal law and state entity law generally requires that the purpose for 
which entities are formed must be a lawful one. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 2001 § 104(b) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (“A limited partnership may be organized under this [Act] for any 
lawful purpose.”); 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 159 (2016) (“Under most corporation 
statutes, corporations may be organized for any lawful business or purpose.”); 54 C.J.S. Limited 
Liability Companies § 1, Westlaw (databased updated 2016) (“A limited liability company may 
be formed for any lawful purpose . . . .”). The safer course of action—albeit one that relies upon 
form over function—is to omit a statement of purpose altogether. 
 121 See § 7-64-1002(1) (statement of registration as an LLP is delivered to the secretary of 
state for filing pursuant to part 3 of article 90, title 7); Colorado Corporations and Associations 
Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-90-306(1) (West 2006) (providing that the secretary of state 
shall file a document delivered to the secretary for filing if it complies with the filing 
requirements set forth in § 7-90-301). 
 122 § 7-64-1002(7). 
 123 A contrary argument could be made on the basis of section 7-90-306(1) of the Colorado 
Revised Statutes, which provides that “[t]he secretary of state has no duty to determine whether 
the document [delivered to the secretary for filing] complies with any or all requirements of 
any law.” § 7-90-306(1). It is left to the person delivering the document to the secretary of state 
to affirm that the delivery of the document for filing is done “in conformity with the 
requirements of [part 3, article 90, title 7 of the Colorado Revised Statutes], the constituent 
documents, and the organic statutes, and that the individual in good faith believes . . . the 
document complies with . . . part 3, the constituent documents, and the organic statutes.” Id. 
§ 7-90-301.5. In this vein, it can be argued that the secretary’s filing is purely ministerial and 
does not constitute the state’s sanction of the LLP’s business. 
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partnerships are formed—i.e., two or more persons associate as co-
owners to carry on a business for profit—means that once persons do 
the acts that the law recognizes as forming a partnership, a partnership 
is formed. As noted above, the state is not necessarily involved in the 
formation of general partnerships unless they are operating under a 
trade name.124 So, if two or more persons associate to carry on as co-
owners the Retail Marijuana Business for profit, they will have formed a 
legally cognizable Colorado partnership, at least as between third parties 
and the partnership.125 
This is a different question than the question of whether an 
association of persons who participate in the Retail Marijuana Business 
would be recognized as a partnership for purposes of determining their 
rights as among themselves. In this instance, there is not the same need 
to protect innocent parties—since all of the co-owners would necessarily 
not be innocent if they have come together to participate in an “illegal” 
business126—so there is not the same rationale for recognizing their 
association as a partnership and adjudicating the parties’ rights as if 
there were a partnership.127 Thus, as between the co-owners, the illegal 
 
 124 See supra text accompanying notes 93–95. 
 125 One primary reason why the law recognizes the partnership’s formation when third 
parties are concerned is to protect innocent third parties against loss. For example, if a person 
were hit by a truck owned by a partnership that was negligently driven by one of the 
partnership’s employees in the course of making a marijuana delivery on behalf of the 
partnership, the injured person could look not only to the partnership’s assets for recovery, but 
also to the individual partners’ assets if the partnership’s assets were insufficient to pay the 
judgment. See § 7-64-306(1) (partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership 
obligations); § 7-64-307(3), (4)(a) (a creditor may satisfy a claim against the partnership from a 
partner’s personal assets if the creditor obtains a judgment against both the partnership and 
such partner and a writ of execution against the judgment has gone unsatisfied in whole or in 
part). If the law provided otherwise, parties could escape such personal liability by conducting 
themselves as a partnership in practice but not formalizing the relationship as a “partnership” 
so as to avoid vicarious personal liability. Estoppel is another means by which the law seeks to 
prevent this result, both for partnerships and for other types of entities, such as corporations. 
See § 7-64-308 (liability of a purported partner); 8 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 3910, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) (corporations by estoppel). The 
partnership formulation of estoppel, known in the Partnership Act as “liability of a purported 
partner,” provides that if a person represents himself as someone else’s partner (but is not 
actually partners with that other person), the purported partner will be liable to a third party 
who relied upon the representation of partnership and entered into a transaction with the 
“partnership” because of it. § 7-64-308(1). More broadly, the doctrine of estoppel provides that 
when a person contracts or otherwise deals with another as a part of a business entity, she is 
then estopped from later denying being a part of that entity in an action based upon or arising 
out of that contract or dealing. See 8 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 3910. 
 126 See Scheuer, supra note 10, at 535 (suggesting that investors in marijuana businesses 
should not have limited liability because “a marijuana business’s entire purpose is to sell 
marijuana, a crime under federal law”). 
 127 Along these lines, it is notable that the provisions for liability of a purported partner are 
included in Part III of the Partnership Act, Relations of Partners to Persons Dealing with 
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purpose doctrine should still apply to deny their association’s existence 
as a legal partnership. 
2.     Dissolution 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that partnerships could 
form to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business, their legal existence 
would be quite brief because of the Partnership Act’s dissolution 
provisions. The problem lies in the relatively mundane term “unlawful” 
that appears in section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act. As 
discussed above,128 this section provides that partnerships dissolve and 
must wind up if an event occurs that makes it “unlawful” for all, or 
substantially all, of their business to be continued. “Unlawful” is not 
defined, either for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) or in the 
Partnership Act’s definitions section.129 Neither is “unlawful” qualified 
 
Partnership, and not in Part IV, Relations of Partners to Each Other and to Partnership. See 
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-64-301 to -308 (Part III); 
§ 7-64-401 to -406 (Part IV). 
 128 See supra text accompanying notes 105–09. 
 129 See §§ 7-64-101 (definitions section), -801 (dissolution section). Nor is the phrase 
“substantially all” defined. See § 7-64-101. The purpose of this phrase is made clear in comment 
7 to section 801 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), which provides that “[t]he ‘all or 
substantially all’ proviso is intended to avoid dissolution for insubstantial or innocent 
regulatory violations.” UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801 cmt. 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997), http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partnership/upa_final_97.pdf. Thus, a partnership probably 
would not dissolve if, for example, it owned an ice cream truck that sold an ice cream bar in 
Denver twenty minutes after sunset, in violation of Denver city ordinances. See DENVER, COLO. 
REV. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 23, art. III, § 23-54(7) (2016) (barring ice cream vendor sales 
between sunset and 10:00 a.m.). However, comment 7 does not address the question of exactly 
how much of the partnership’s business must be unlawful before dissolution is triggered. Both 
the Code and the Rules permit retail marijuana stores to sell items other than marijuana, such 
as clothing. See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-43.4-402(7) 
(West 2010) (specifying products that licensed retail marijuana stores may sell, including 
“nonconsumable products such as apparel”); Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. 
§ 212-2.402(H) (2013) (amended 2017) (prohibiting Retail Marijuana Stores from selling 
consumable products other than Retail Marijuana Products). Imagine a partnership that 
operates a retail marijuana store that sells both retail marijuana and marijuana-themed t-shirts. 
Is this partnership’s business the sale of marijuana (unlawful under the CSA) or the sale of 
clothing (lawful)? If fifty percent of the partnership’s revenue comes from marijuana sales and 
the other fifty percent comes from t-shirt sales, is the Retail Marijuana Business “substantially 
all” of this partnership’s business? What if t-shirt sales constitute eighty percent of the 
partnership’s revenue? Or is sales volume, rather than revenue, the relevant inquiry, assuming 
that marijuana commands a higher price than t-shirts on a per-unit basis? There is no Colorado 
case law providing guidance on the issue of what constitutes “substantially all” of a 
partnership’s business. Some jurists have commented that the phrase seems to mean, roughly, 
“very slightly less than all.” See Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse 
Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1155 (7th Cir. 1990) (“‘Substantially all’ 
sounds like ‘less than all, but not much less.’”); Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 
342, 377 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“A fair and succinct equivalent to the term ‘substantially all’ 
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by reference to state law—section 7-64-801(1)(d) simply says a 
partnership dissolves if it becomes “unlawful” to continue its business. If 
“unlawful” is not expressly limited to state law, it seemingly refers to 
both state and federal law—which would mean that if a partnership’s 
business becomes unlawful under either state or federal law the 
partnership automatically dissolves. Therefore, strictly speaking, no 
general or limited liability partnership would be able to engage in the 
Retail Marijuana Business because even if the partnership were able to 
form for that purpose,130 it would dissolve and would be required to 
wind up as soon as it had been formed.131 
This interpretation of “unlawful” is consistent with dictionary 
definitions and the term’s plain meaning. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“unlawful” as “[n]ot authorized by law; illegal,” “[c]riminally 
punishable,” or “[i]nvolving moral turpitude.”132 Similarly, the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines it as “[c]ontrary to law; prohibited by law; 
illegal.”133 Like its synonym “illegal,”134 “unlawful” is thus unbounded by 
 
would . . . be ‘essentially everything.’”). The Internal Revenue Service interprets “substantially 
all” to mean at least eighty-five percent of whatever is being measured. See Cont’l Can Co., 916 
F.2d at 1158 (noting that “‘[s]ubstantially all’ is one of those phrases with a special legal 
meaning” and listing examples of tax statutes and regulations that quantify the phrase as 
meaning eighty-five percent or more). In keeping with these definitions, a Colorado court 
could decide that the Retail Marijuana Business constitutes “substantially all” of a partnership’s 
business if at least eighty-five percent of the partnership’s revenue (or sales volume, or profits, 
or some other quantifiable measure) comes from selling retail marijuana—though other factors 
(the parties’ written and oral agreements and conduct, the partnership’s tax filings, etc.) could 
certainly also be important to the court’s determination. 
 130 This Article’s contention remains that partnerships cannot form to engage in the Retail 
Marijuana Business. See supra notes 110–27 and accompanying text. 
 131 The landscape is less complicated for LPs, LLCs, and corporations on the subject of 
dissolution than it is for general and limited liability partnerships, in large part because of 
differences in the ways that the dissolution provisions in each entity’s governing statute are 
drafted. In brief, none of the statutes pertaining to LPs, LLCs, or corporations provides for the 
same type of automatic and unavoidable dissolution as does the Partnership Act in the event 
the entity’s business becomes unlawful. See Colorado Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1981, 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-62-801 to -802 (providing for dissolution of LPs); Colorado Limited 
Liability Company Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-801, -810 (providing for dissolution of 
LLCs); Colorado Business Corporation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-114-101 to -102.5 
(providing for dissolution of corporations). Because of this, there is less reason to believe that 
the inconsistencies between state and federal marijuana law will be problematic for these other 
entities as pertains to dissolution. LLCs and corporations are theoretically vulnerable to a 
dissolution proceeding brought by the attorney general on the grounds that they are 
“exceed[ing] or abus[ing] the authority conferred upon [them] by law,” as permitted under the 
LLC and corporation statutes. See § 7-80-810 (LLCs); § 7-114-301 (corporations). Yet it is 
highly unlikely that Colorado’s attorney general would bring such a proceeding to attack a 
domestic entity for engaging in business specifically authorized under state statutory and 
regulatory authority. Thus, the unintended consequence of mandatory dissolution appears to 
be a problem only for general and limited liability partnerships. 
 132 Unlawful, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 133 Unlawful, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
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reference to any particular source or body of law. Its plain meaning is 
inclusive of both state and federal law. As a matter of statutory 
construction, courts strive to interpret statutes in accordance with the 
plain meaning of their terms, unless there is a clear indication that some 
meaning other than the plain meaning was intended.135 There is no 
indication in section 7-64-801(1)(d), or elsewhere in the Partnership 
Act, that “unlawful” has any other meaning than its plain meaning. 
Accordingly, “unlawful” should be given its ordinary meaning in 
construing section 7-64-801(1)(d). 
Applying this ordinary meaning, the Retail Marijuana Business is 
unlawful. Though it is authorized by the Marijuana Laws, it is illegal, 
prohibited by law, and criminally punishable under the CSA. Unless it is 
somehow qualified, “unlawful” permits no equivocation—an activity 
either is unlawful or it is not. To be lawful (as in, not unlawful),136 an 
activity must be wholly lawful; a fair interpretation of the term does not 
contemplate lawfulness (or unlawfulness) in part. This means that an 
activity that is permitted under state law but prohibited under federal 
law must be deemed unlawful, the same way that an activity that is 
permitted under federal law but prohibited under state law would be 
considered unlawful by that state.137 And so, a judge should deem the 
Retail Marijuana Business “unlawful” for purposes of section 7-64-
801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act when applying the plain meaning of 
the term. 
 
 134 See supra text accompanying notes 112–14. Section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act 
uses “illegal[]” in the second clause of the provision (i.e., “a cure of illegality within ninety days 
after the partnership has notice of the event is effective retroactively to the date of the event for 
purposes of this section”), which bolsters the argument that “unlawful,” as used here, is a 
synonym of “illegal.” See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-801(1)(d); see also People v. Barrus, 232 P.3d 
264, 268 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[T]he term ‘illegal’ is typically synonymous with the term 
‘unlawful.’” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))). 
 135 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (“The plain 
meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters.’ In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.” 
(quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))); Marks v. Koch, 284 
P.3d 118, 123 (Colo. App. 2011) (“When a statute does not define its terms but the words used 
are terms of common usage, we may refer to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and 
ordinary meanings of those words.”). 
 136 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “lawful” as “[n]ot contrary to law; permitted or 
recognized by law.” Lawful, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); accord Lawful, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“According or not contrary to law, permitted by law.”). 
“Unlawful” is considered an antonym of “lawful.” E.g., O’Brien v. Walker, 35 Haw. 104, 142 
(1939) (“The word ‘lawful’ is an antonym of ‘unlawful’ or ‘illegitimate.’”). 
 137 For example, smoking in a bar or restaurant is not prohibited as a matter of federal law, 
but it is prohibited by the Colorado Clean Indoor Air Act. See Colorado Clean Indoor Air Act, 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-14-204(1)(l), (m) (West 2008) (banning smoking in all indoor 
areas, including food service establishments and bars). Smoking in a bar or restaurant would 
therefore be considered “unlawful” in Colorado. 
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Colorado courts—and courts of other jurisdictions, for that 
matter138—have not yet construed the term “unlawful” as used in this 
section of the Partnership Act, or as used in business entity law 
generally.139 Nor is there reference to the term in the legislative 
discussions regarding the Partnership Act or its predecessor law.140 
Colorado courts have, however, grappled with unlawful’s antonym, 
lawful, in the context of an employment discrimination case. In Coats v. 
 
 138 The Uniform Partnership Act (1997) was drafted by the Uniform Law Commission to 
replace the Commission’s 1914 Uniform Partnership Act. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, UNIFORM 
PARTNERSHIP ACT (UPA) (1997) (LAST AMENDED 2013): SUMMARY 1 (2015), http://www
.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Partnership/upa%20last%20amended%202013%20summary_
Jan%202015_GH%20edits.pdf. Colorado adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) via 
House Bill 97-1237, which was signed into law on May 21, 1997, effective January 1, 1998. 
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), H.B. 97-1237, 61st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 
1997). As of the date of this Article, thirty-nine states, plus the District of Columbia and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, have adopted some version of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997), and a 
fortieth introduced a bill in 2017 for the act’s enactment. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Partnership 
Act (1997) (Last Amended 2013), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act%20(1997)%20(Last%20Amended%202013) 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (listing states that have enacted the act). Section 7-64-1201 of the 
Partnership Act provides that the Partnership Act “shall be applied and construed to effectuate 
its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of [the Partnership Act] 
among states enacting it.” § 7-64-1201. Thus, another state’s court’s construction of the term 
“unlawful” would certainly be relevant and instructive for Colorado courts. 
 139 There are no Colorado cases invoking either section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership 
Act or its predecessor provision, section 7-60-131(c) of the Uniform Partnership Law. The 
question of a partnership business’s unlawfulness has arisen primarily when parties have sought 
the court’s assistance in the dissolution process or in enforcing the parties’ rights under a 
partnership agreement or other contract. See, e.g., Thompson v. McCormick, 370 P.2d 442, 447 
(Colo. 1962) (en banc); Searles v. Haynes, 130 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1955) (en banc); 
Brower v. Johnson, 352 P.2d 814 (Wash. 1960); Williams v. Burrus, 581 P.2d 164, 166 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1978). Courts have considered whether a particular partnership business was unlawful 
under the relevant statute, but have not addressed the meaning of “unlawful” for purposes of 
partnership dissolution statutes generally. See, e.g., Brower, 352 P.2d at 816–18. In other 
contexts, courts have found it unnecessary to define “unlawful” because it is a commonly 
understood term. See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 746 F. 3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“The meaning of unlawful is common knowledge and ordinarily does not need to be defined.” 
(citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Preston, 257 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1958) 
(“[A] court is not required to define words and phrases which are familiar to one of ordinary 
intelligence.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)))). 
 140 The comments to the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) do not provide any further clarity. 
The drafters’ comments to the relevant section provide the following: 
Section 801(4) continues the basic rule in [the predecessor to the Uniform 
Partnership Act (1997)] and provides for dissolution if it is unlawful to continue the 
business of the partnership, unless cured. The “all or substantially all” proviso is 
intended to avoid dissolution for insubstantial or innocent regulatory violations. If 
the illegality is cured within 90 days after notice to the partnership, it is effective 
retroactively for purposes of this section. The requirement that an uncured illegal 
business be wound up cannot be varied in the partnership agreement. 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801 cmt. 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997), http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/partnership/upa_final_97.pdf. Neither the term “unlawful” nor the term “illegal” is 
further defined. See id. 
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Dish Network, L.L.C.,141 the Colorado Court of Appeals considered 
whether medical marijuana use constituted a “lawful activity” under 
Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute (Lawful Activities Statute).142 The 
statute prohibits Colorado employers from terminating employees 
based on the employees’ engaging in “lawful activity” off-premises 
during their nonworking hours, with certain exceptions.143 The plaintiff, 
Brandon Coats, a man who held a Colorado license to use medical 
marijuana, was terminated from his employment with Dish Network, 
L.L.C. (Dish) following a positive drug test for marijuana, which 
violated Dish’s drug policy.144 Coats filed an action against Dish, 
claiming his termination violated the Lawful Activities Statute; Dish 
defended on the grounds that medical marijuana use was not a “lawful 
activity” because it was prohibited under federal law.145 
In a split decision, the Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed 
Coats’s claim, holding that medical marijuana use is not a “lawful 
activity” for purposes of the Lawful Activities Statute because at the time 
of Coats’s termination marijuana use was illegal under federal law.146 In 
so holding, the court first looked to the statute to see if “lawful activity” 
was a defined term.147 Since it was not, the court next looked to the 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word “lawful,” which means 
“permitted by law.”148 The court then determined that medical 
marijuana use could not be “lawful” because the term implies an activity 
that is permitted by both state and federal law.149 The court found 
persuasive the fact that there was no reference in the legislative history 
 
 141 Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C. (Coats I), 2013 COA 62. 
 142 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5 (West 2015). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Coats I, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 4. 
 145 Id. ¶¶ 8–14. Dish also argued that medical marijuana use was prohibited under state law, 
and the trial court accepted this argument on the theory that the Colorado constitution 
provided an affirmative defense from prosecution for medical marijuana use but did not 
establish a state constitutional right to that use. Id. ¶ 6. This claim was not reached on appeal. 
See id. ¶¶ 6–7; Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C. (Coats II), 2015 CO 44, ¶ 21 (en banc) 
[hereinafter, together with Coats I, Coats]. 
 146 Coats I, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 23. The dissenting judge, Judge Webb, would have held that the 
term “lawful” as used in the Lawful Activities Statute only refers to Colorado state law, under 
which medical marijuana use is “at least lawful,” and not to federal law. Id. ¶ 56 (Webb, J., 
dissenting). 
 147 See id. ¶ 12 (majority opinion). 
 148 See id. ¶ 13. 
 149 Id. ¶ 14. As the court put it,  
because activities conducted in Colorado, including medical marijuana use, are 
subject to both state and federal law, for an activity to be “lawful” in Colorado, it 
must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law. Conversely, an 
activity that violates federal law but complies with state law cannot be “lawful” under 
the ordinary meaning of that term.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
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to the term “lawful,” so there was no indication whether the legislature 
intended the word to include activities prohibited only under federal 
law.150 The appellate court also rejected Coats’s argument that including 
activity that is permitted under both state and federal law within the 
scope of “lawful activity” “improperly ‘compels’ Colorado to enforce 
federal criminal law.”151 
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “an activity 
such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful under federal law is not a 
‘lawful’ activity.” for purposes of the Lawful Activities Statute.152 Relying 
upon its earlier construction of the term “lawful,” the supreme court 
agreed with the appellate court “that the commonly accepted meaning 
of the term ‘lawful’ is ‘that which is ‘permitted by law’ or, conversely, 
that which is ‘not contrary to, or forbidden by law.’”153 Like the appellate 
court, the supreme court also rejected Coats’s argument that the 
statutory language should be limited by state law, stating “[n]othing in 
the language of the statute limits the term ‘lawful’ to state law. Instead, 
the term is used in its general, unrestricted sense, indicating that a 
‘lawful’ activity is that which complies with applicable ‘law,’ including 
state and federal law.”154 Because medical marijuana use remained 
prohibited under the CSA and “unlawful under federal law,” this use 
could not be a lawful activity under the Lawful Activities Statute.155 
Though Coats construed an employment statute, its reasoning is 
equally applicable to a business entity statute.156 As in the Lawful 
 
 150 See id. ¶ 17. 
 151 Id. ¶ 22 (relying upon People v. Watkins, 2012 COA 15, ¶ 33). 
 152 Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 4 (en banc). 
 153 The court cited its earlier opinion in People v. Schuett for the proposition that the 
ordinary meaning of “lawful” is “in accordance with the law or legitimate.” Id. ¶ 17 (quoting 
People v. Schuett, 833 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo. 1992)). The court noted that this meaning accords 
with the meaning given to the term by courts of other jurisdictions. See id. (citing cases). 
 154 Id. ¶ 18. The court also noted the lack of any evidence that the Colorado legislature 
intended activities that are prohibited under federal law to be protected by the Lawful Activities 
Statute. Id. ¶ 20. The Colorado Supreme Court has since adhered to its interpretation of 
“lawful” in Coats II, stating: “Consistent with our holding in Coats . . . we again find that 
conduct is ‘lawful’ only if it complies with both federal and state law.” People v. Crouse, 2017 
CO 5, ¶ 18. 
 155 Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 19.  
 156 It is clear from Crouse that the Colorado Supreme Court’s interpretation of “lawful” in 
Coats II was not specific to the particular statute at issue in Coats, nor to the employment 
context. Police arrested Crouse, a registered medical marijuana patient, for cultivation and 
possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture; they also seized from him fifty-five 
marijuana plants and nearly three kilograms of marijuana. Crouse, 2017 CO 5, ¶ 4. Crouse was 
acquitted at trial and requested that the court order the police to return the seized marijuana 
and plants to him under a provision of the Colorado constitution that requires law enforcement 
officials to return marijuana taken from medical marijuana patients upon their acquittal. Id. 
¶ 5. The supreme court held that the statute provision was preempted by the CSA because 
compliance with the return provision would require law enforcement officials to “distribute” 
marijuana in violation of the CSA. Id. ¶¶ 5, 19. In so holding, the supreme court also found that 
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Activities Statute, nothing in the Partnership Act suggests that the 
Colorado legislature intended for “unlawful”157 to have any other 
meaning than its ordinary meaning. And nothing in the language of the 
Partnership Act or in its legislative history suggests that the Colorado 
General Assembly intended for business activities that are prohibited 
under federal law to be excluded from the meaning of “unlawful” in the 
Partnership Act. Therefore, applying Coats, the Retail Marijuana 
Business is “unlawful” for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the 
Partnership Act, and partnerships formed for that purpose (assuming 
formation is possible) dissolve automatically immediately after 
formation. 
D.     Can These Consequences Be Avoided? 
Preventing partnerships from forming to engage in the Retail 
Marijuana Business or mandating their dissolution as soon as they are 
formed is surely not the Marijuana Laws’ intended outcome. This 
Section presents—and largely rejects—three arguments that could be 
made to persuade a Colorado court to find that Retail Marijuana 
Partnerships do not face automatic dissolution.158 
 
the conflict could not be avoided on the basis of a CSA provision that immunizes law 
enforcement officers who are “lawfully engaged” in enforcement of laws pertaining to 
controlled substances. Id. ¶ 18. The court reasoned that, if the officers gave the marijuana back 
to Crouse, they “could not be ‘lawfully engaged’ in law enforcement activities given that such 
conduct would violate federal law.” Id. It seems likely that the Colorado Supreme Court will 
apply the same interpretation of “lawful” to a business entity statute as it has applied in Coats II 
and Crouse. 
 157 Admittedly, Coats construed the word “lawful” and not its antonym. Yet is unlikely that 
the prefix “un-” would have a substantive effect on the court’s analysis. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “un-” as a prefix meaning “[n]ot;” or “[c]ontrary to; against.” Un-, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Hence, “unlawful” means “not lawful.” Applying this same 
process to the court’s definition of “lawful,” “unlawful” would mean “that which is not 
permitted by law or, conversely, that which is contrary to, or forbidden by law.” Similarly, an 
“unlawful” activity would be “that which does not comply with applicable law, including state 
and federal law.” Applying the supreme court’s analysis to the facts of Coats, medical marijuana 
use would be “unlawful” for purposes of the Lawful Activities Statute because such use does not 
comply with federal law (i.e., the CSA). 
 158 None of these arguments is especially helpful with respect to the formation issue. See 
infra notes 160, 164, and 168 for a discussion of why the particular arguments do not resolve 
the problem of illegal formation. Since the illegal purpose doctrine arises from common law, 
the formation problem would best be avoided by either a judicial ruling that the Retail 
Marijuana Business is not an illegal purpose within the meaning of the illegal purpose doctrine, 
or a legislative amendment specifically to this end. See supra text accompanying notes 115–18; 
see also infra text accompanying notes 206–09 and 219–21. 
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1.     Preemption of the Partnership Act 
The first argument comes from the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s 
express preemption language. Subsection (8) of the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment provides that “[a]ll provisions of this section . . . shall 
supersede conflicting state statutory, local charter, ordinance, or 
resolution, and other state and local provisions.”159 One could argue that 
section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act is a “conflicting” statutory 
provision within the meaning of subsection (8) of the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment and therefore is superseded by the constitutional 
provisions, with the effect that there is no automatic dissolution160 for 
Retail Marijuana Partnerships. 
This argument probably will be unavailing because Colorado 
courts are unlikely to find a conflict161 between subsection (8) of the 
Retail Marijuana Amendment and section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the 
Partnership Act. As a threshold matter, nothing in the language of 
subsection (8) (or the remainder of the Retail Marijuana Amendment) 
expressly implicates the Partnership Act or indicates the drafters’ intent 
to preempt the Partnership Act. Nor can it fairly be said that a 
constitutional amendment legalizing recreational marijuana sales is 
aimed at regulating Colorado’s partnerships such that the Retail 
Marijuana Amendment occupies the field of partnership regulation. 
Further, there is no actual conflict between section 7-64-801(1)(d) 
and the Retail Marijuana Amendment. The Retail Marijuana 
Amendment makes it “not unlawful” under Colorado law to engage in 
 
 159 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 8. 
 160 Even finding that the Retail Marijuana Amendment preempts the Partnership Act with 
respect to partnership dissolution probably does not avoid the formation problem, since the 
amendment’s preemption language contemplates a conflict with a statute or regulatory 
provision. The illegal purpose doctrine comes not from a statute, but rather from the common 
law. The doctrine is therefore outside the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s express preemption 
language. 
 161 Colorado’s preemption doctrine for resolving state law conflicts borrows from its cases 
resolving conflicts between state and federal laws. Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 
199 P.3d 718, 723 (Colo. 2009) (en banc). The Colorado Supreme Court has explained 
Colorado’s preemption doctrine for federal law conflicts as follows: 
Federal law preempts state law when Congress expresses clear intent to preempt state 
law; when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law; when 
compliance with both federal and state law is physically impossible; when there is an 
implicit barrier within federal law to state regulation in a particular area; when 
federal legislation is so comprehensive as to occupy the entire field of regulation; or 
when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
objectives of Congress. 
Dep’t of Health v. Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1004 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (citing Frontier Airlines, Inc. 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1399, 1407 (D. Colo.1989)). 
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the Retail Marijuana Business. Section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership 
Act contemplates dissolution when the partnership’s business becomes 
unlawful, without specifying a particular source of law that, if violated, 
would trigger dissolution. It would be a different situation if the 
Partnership Act imposed dissolution, for example, for unlawful business 
activity such as engaging in the sale or distribution of marijuana. 
Nor is it impossible to comply with both the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment and section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act. For 
instance, if a partnership were formed to engage in the fracking industry 
and fracking subsequently became unlawful under Colorado law, the 
partnership’s dissolution under the Partnership Act would not implicate 
the Retail Marijuana Amendment in any way. Perhaps one could argue 
that the Partnership Act’s dissolution provisions are an obstacle to 
accomplishing the objectives of the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s 
drafters, but this is somewhat of a weak argument; section 7-64-
801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act simply has nothing to do with whether 
marijuana sales are lawful under Colorado law. The unintended 
consequences under section 7-64-801(1)(d) come because marijuana 
sales remain unlawful under federal law, not because of a conflict 
between the Partnership Act and the Retail Marijuana Amendment. 
Consequently, a court should reject the argument that the Retail 
Marijuana Amendment preempts section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the 
Partnership Act because they conflict. 
2.     Technical Argument Under the Partnership Act 
The second potential argument why a court should find that the 
Partnership Act does not mandate dissolution of Retail Marijuana 
Partnerships comes from the language of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the 
Partnership Act. The Partnership Act specifically contemplates 
dissolution upon “occurrence” of an “event that makes it” unlawful for 
the partnership’s business “to be continued.”162 In other words, the 
statute contemplates that a partnership’s business would be lawful upon 
formation but would thereafter become unlawful, presumably because 
of a change in the law. It does not contemplate the situation in which a 
partnership is formed to engage in business that is already unlawful—
which makes sense, given that partnerships may not be formed for an 
illegal purpose.163 A technical argument could be made that dissolution 
would not be triggered under section 7-64-801(1)(d) if a partnership 
 
 162 Colorado Uniform Partnership Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-801(1)(d) (West 
2006). 
 163 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
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were formed to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business because no 
“event” would “occur” that would “make” it unlawful for the 
partnership’s business to continue—that is, since the Retail Marijuana 
Business is already unlawful under federal law, there is no triggering 
event after the partnership’s formation that causes the business to be 
unlawful, and, thus, section 7-64-801(1)(d) would not be implicated, 
and the partnership would not dissolve.164 
A court seeking to avoid the Marijuana Laws’ unintended 
consequences could be sympathetic to this type of technical argument, 
within limits. On the one hand, it is hard to believe that the Colorado 
General Assembly intended for Retail Marijuana Partnerships to 
dissolve immediately after their formation, given that the Marijuana 
Laws do authorize partnerships to participate in the Retail Marijuana 
Business.165 This leaves room for a narrow ruling that engagement in the 
Retail Marijuana Business does not trigger dissolution under section 7-
64-801(1)(d). On the other hand, it is also hard to believe that the 
Colorado General Assembly would intend section 7-64-801(1)(d) to 
capture activity that becomes unlawful after the partnership is formed, 
but not activity that is illegal prior to formation. Under that line of 
reasoning, a partnership formed tomorrow for the purpose of carrying 
out contract killings would not trigger the statute’s dissolution 
provisions, since murder is already illegal under both Colorado and 
federal law.166 Any ruling other than a very narrow one in favor of this 
technical argument risks compounding unintended consequences upon 
unintended consequences. 
3.     “Unlawful” as Limited by the Retail Marijuana Amendment 
The third potential argument why a Retail Marijuana Partnership 
would not automatically dissolve is that the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment’s express language attempts to harmonize the amendment 
with other bodies of Colorado law in a way that avoids unintended 
consequences such as this one. Subsection (4) of the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the following acts are not unlawful and shall not be an offense under 
Colorado law . . . .” Subsection (4) goes on to list a number of activities 
 
 164 This technical argument would not address the illegal formation issue, given that the 
argument relies upon a specific construction of statutory language and the illegal purpose 
doctrine arises from case law, not a similar statutory provision. 
 165 See supra Section I.C.  
 166 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012) (murder); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (West 2013) 
(murder in the first degree). 
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involved in the Retail Marijuana Business (e.g., cultivating, harvesting, 
selling, or transporting marijuana).167 Someone trying to avoid 
automatic dissolution of a Retail Marijuana Partnership might argue for 
an interpretation of subsection (4) roughly along these lines: “No matter 
whether the Retail Marijuana Business is illegal under federal or any 
other state’s law, it will be not considered ‘unlawful’ whenever that term 
is used in Colorado state laws.” Adopting that interpretation would 
seem to save partnerships from automatic dissolution168 under section 
7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act: if the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment’s language means that the word “unlawful” as used in 
Colorado statutes does not apply to the Retail Marijuana Business, then 
the business of Retail Marijuana Partnerships would not be “unlawful” 
for purposes of the Partnership Act. 
This argument is the most compelling of the three, though it is still 
unclear whether this interpretation would succeed after the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Coats II. Section 14 of article XVIII of the 
Colorado constitution, the section of the constitution authorizing 
medical marijuana use (Medical Marijuana Amendment),169 was the 
section at issue in Coats.170 Subsection 4(a) of the Medical Marijuana 
Amendment provides, in relevant part, “[a] patient’s medical use of 
marijuana, within the following limits, is lawful.”171 And yet the court 
still held that medical marijuana use was not a “lawful” activity under 
the Lawful Activities Statute because such use remained illegal under 
federal law and “lawful,” as used in the Lawful Activities Statute, was not 
limited to state law.172 
However, Coats leaves room for doubt about how the Colorado 
Supreme Court would rule in a similar case involving subsection (4) of 
the Retail Marijuana Amendment. The courts in Coats were able to 
decide on the basis of the federal prohibition on marijuana use. 
 
 167 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 4 (emphasis added). 
 168 This interpretation of subsection (4) would not necessarily avoid the illegal purpose 
doctrine issue, however. It is one thing to say that the definition of “unlawful” in Colorado 
statutes will be shaped by the Colorado constitution, and that if the constitution says something 
is not unlawful, that holds true for all instances of the term “unlawful” in Colorado statutes. It 
is another thing to say that a provision in the Colorado constitution could make an act not 
unlawful generally speaking; as discussed throughout this Article, marijuana sales remain illegal 
under federal law, and so the illegal purpose doctrine might still come into play. An 
amendment of the Partnership Act providing that formation of a partnership is permissible for 
a purpose that is lawful under state law, even if that purpose is unlawful under federal law, 
could eliminate the problem—though it might also open the door to formation of partnerships 
for purposes that are not forbidden under Colorado law but that Colorado would not want to 
permit. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 169 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14. 
 170 See Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 1. 
 171 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14, cl. 4(a). 
 172 See Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶¶ 4, 13; see also supra notes 154, 156. 
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Accordingly, the courts did not address the state law issue of whether 
the Medical Marijuana Amendment created a state constitutional right 
to state-licensed medical marijuana use, or what the consequences of 
such a constitutional right would be for Coats’s case.173 
Moreover, the Medical Marijuana Amendment’s language is 
somewhat less explicit than that of the Retail Marijuana Amendment. 
The Medical Marijuana Amendment provides that compliance with its 
terms is an “affirmative defense” to the state criminal laws related to 
medical marijuana use and that it is an “exception from the state’s 
criminal laws” to engage in or assist in medical marijuana use in 
compliance with the constitutional provisions.174 It does not have 
language parallel to that in subsection (4) of the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment, which purports to make the Retail Marijuana Business 
“not unlawful” “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”175 
Accordingly, the Retail Marijuana Amendment’s language may present 
a more compelling case for the Colorado Supreme Court to find that the 
ballot initiative writers and the legislature intended the Retail Marijuana 
Business to be considered not “unlawful” for purposes of all of 
Colorado’s laws, both statutory and common176—even though, of 
course, no amount of legislative intent in Colorado could prevent the 
Retail Marijuana Business from being unlawful under federal law.177 
III.     THE HARM AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The preceding Parts laid out the relevant laws and the potential 
legal consequences of those laws for Retail Marijuana Partnerships. This 
Part first examines the practical consequences of the legal issues created 
 
 173 See Coats I, 2013 COA 62, ¶ 23; Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 21. 
 174 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14, cl. 2(a)–(c). 
 175 Id. § 16, cl. 4; see id. § 14. 
 176 However, such broad legalization may not actually have been the intent of the ballot 
initiative’s drafters. The Retail Marijuana Amendment is entitled “Personal use and regulation 
of marijuana.” Id. § 16. The reference to “regulation,” rather than “legalization,” was 
intentional. At the initial hearing on June 15, 2011, of the Colorado Title Board to set the ballot 
title for the Retail Marijuana Amendment, the authors of the initiative asked the Title Board to 
remove the word “legalization” from the ballot title. See Title Board Hearing 06-15-2011, COLO. 
TITLE BD. (June 15, 2011), http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/info_center/audioArchives.html. As 
co-author Steve Fox, a Washington, D.C. lobbyist for the Marijuana Policy Project, said at that 
hearing, “legalization is not what this is . . . . What we are doing is regulating marijuana. And 
it’s a significant legal difference. It would be inaccurate to call this legalization.” Id. 
 177 See In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 805 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) (“That 
marijuana cultivation may not be criminally prosecuted under the laws of the state of Colorado 
is simply of no consequence and has no bearing on the Court’s finding that Debtor’s business 
operation constitutes a continuing criminal violation of the federal Controlled Substances 
Act.”). 
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by the interplay between the Marijuana Laws and the partnership laws. 
It then critiques four potential solutions to these legal issues and 
advocates adoption of the most viable one. 
A.     What Is the Harm? 
If the formation and dissolution issues caused by the interaction 
between the Marijuana Laws and the partnership laws have no 
significant real-world consequences for those who plan to engage in the 
Retail Marijuana Business, then this discussion is merely a tempest in a 
teapot. This Section examines the likely practical effect of, first, an 
inability to form general and limited liability partnerships to engage in 
the Retail Marijuana Business because of the illegal purpose doctrine, 
and, second, the automatic triggering of such partnerships’ dissolution 
under section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act. 
1.     Formation Consequences 
Would it really be so terrible if there were no Retail Marijuana 
Partnerships? Would Colorado be worse off if all businesses engaged in 
the Retail Marijuana Business were organized as some entity other than 
a general or limited liability partnership? Is there actually some need to 
address the Marijuana Laws’ unintended consequences for formation of 
partnerships, more so than for some other form of entity?178 In answer 
to all of these questions, yes and no. 
First, the scale of the problem may not be all that large because the 
popularity of partnerships is waning. Limited liability companies (LLCs) 
are becoming the most popular form of business entity.179 For 
comparison, in 2012 and 2013, a total of 123,992 new LLCs were formed 
in Colorado, compared to 20,331 new for-profit corporations, 679 LLPs, 
and 483 new LPs.180 The rise in the LLC’s popularity is presumably due 
 
 178 See supra note 120. 
 179 See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the 
Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 
and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002—2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 
459–60 (2010) (“The limited liability company (LLC) is now undeniably the most popular form 
of new business entity in the United States.”). Chrisman remarks that this fact “is amazing, 
especially because for most of America’s history the general partnership and the corporation 
dominated the business organizations’ landscape.” Id. at 460. 
 180 INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADMIN’RS, ANNUAL REPORT OF JURISDICTIONS 2012 AND 
2013, at 1–2, 4 (2014), https://www.iaca.org/wp-content/uploads/Colorado.pdf. The 
corporations figure includes both business and professional corporations. Id. at 1. 
Unfortunately, there are no figures available for general partnerships, as their formation does 
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to the form’s many benefits.181 Perhaps chief among these is that LLCs 
provide their equity owners with limited liability for the entity’s 
obligations, which general partnerships do not.182 Accordingly, it has 
been suggested that most businesses engaged in the Retail Marijuana 
Business will be formed as LLCs.183 If this proves true and few 
businesses engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business are formed as 
partnerships, then the real-world consequences of the problems 
discussed in this Article may be limited in scope. 
Yet limited in scope is not the same as nonexistent. The general 
partnership is the default form of business entity for businesses owned 
by two or more persons who do not choose another form.184 Operating 
as a partnership with an enforceable partnership agreement (or at least a 
set of statutory default rules) not only provides some degree of 
protection for the rights of the partners, but it also provides protection 
for the partnership’s third-party creditors. As noted earlier,185 partners 
retain personal liability for the partnership’s debts and obligations. If the 
law does not recognize that a partnership has been created, the law also 
may not impose vicarious liability upon the business’s owners for the 
protection of innocent third parties harmed by the acts of the business 
or one of its owners. 
For instance, consider the scenario in which two people, Jordan 
and Stan, are working together in a Retail Marijuana Business that in all 
respects meets the definition of a “partnership,” other than the fact that 
it is formed for purposes of engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business. 
There is no written agreement between Jordan and Stan, and no 
established course of conduct for their dealings together, as their 
 
not require state filing and thus cannot be tracked. See Chrisman, supra note 179, at 461 (“The 
number of general partnerships formed each year cannot be tracked since no filing is 
required.”); supra text accompanying note 94. 
 181 See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A 
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:5 Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) 
(discussing benefits of forming an LLC). 
 182 See Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-705 (West 
2006) (LLC members are not liable for the LLC’s obligations); Colorado Uniform Partnership 
Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-64-306(1) (all partners are jointly and severally liable 
for partnership obligations). But see Scheuer, supra note 10, at 532–37 (discussing how 
investors in various business entities, including LLCs, engaged in marijuana-related businesses 
may lose limited liability protection because of the illegal nature of the marijuana business). 
LLPs provide partners with limited liability, see § 7-64-306(3), but they lack some of the other 
features that make LLCs desirable, such as the ability to have a single owner. See CALLISON & 
SULLIVAN, supra note 181, § 3:1 (LLC member requirements). 
 183 See Scheuer, supra note 10, at 532 (asserting that “most” marijuana businesses in states in 
which marijuana businesses are legal will elect to form as LLCs). 
 184 See J. William Callison, New Entity Classification Regulations, 26 COLO. LAW., Apr. 1997, 
at 3, 6 (“[N]oncorporate organizations with at least two members are partnerships.”). 
 185 See supra note 125. 
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business is brand new. Without consulting Stan, Jordan asks an 
acquaintance of hers, André, for a loan for “her” business. Jordan never 
mentions to André the fact that she is working with someone else, and 
André believes that Jordan is operating a business by herself. André 
gives Jordan $2000 for operating expenses in exchange for Jordan’s 
promise to repay the sum with interest. Instead, Jordan disappears with 
the money, leaving André unpaid. 
If Jordan and Stan have a “partnership,” André may have recourse 
against both the partnership and Stan for the $2000. Section 301(1)(a) of 
the Partnership Act provides that each partner is the partnership’s 
“agent,” and any act of a partner “for apparently carrying on in the 
ordinary course the partnership business . . . binds the partnership, 
unless the partner had no authority to act for the partnership in the 
particular matter and the person with whom the partner was dealing 
had notice that the partner lacked authority.”186 In this example Jordan 
has no authority to enter into a loan agreement with André because she 
has not consulted Stan, and a business decision generally requires either 
a majority or unanimous vote of the partners, depending upon whether 
the matter is in or outside the ordinary course of the partnership’s 
business.187 Yet her act—obtaining a loan for purposes of operating 
expenses—is at least apparently for carrying on the business in the 
ordinary course, and André has no knowledge or notification of the fact 
that Jordan has no authority, since he thinks she is the sole owner of her 
business. Thus, under section 7-64-301(1)(a) of the Partnership Act, the 
partnership would probably be bound by Jordan’s loan agreement with 
André and André could look to the assets of the partnership, and 
potentially to Stan’s personal assets,188 to recover the loan. 
If the law does not recognize the business as a partnership and the 
default partnership rules do not apply, then André may be left without a 
satisfactory remedy if he cannot collect from Jordan. In this case, 
Jordan’s act likely would not implicate Stan in any way that would 
impose personal liability upon him: he did not have knowledge of her 
actions, did not authorize them, and did not receive any benefits from 
them (since she absconded with the money) or otherwise ratify her 
taking the loan from André.189 Even the purported partner doctrine190 
 
 186 § 7-64-301(1)(a). 
 187 See id. § 7-64-401(10) (ordinary course decision requires a majority vote while 
extraordinary decision requires a unanimous vote). Accordingly, regardless of whether the 
decision to take out a small loan is considered ordinary course or an extraordinary decision, 
Jordan could not make that decision unilaterally on behalf of the partnership unless some 
agreement between her and Stan permitted her to do so. 
 188 See supra note 125. 
 189 Two lines of analysis are relevant here. First, it should be determined whether Jordan is 
acting as Stan’s agent. An “agent” is a person who, by mutual agreement, acts on behalf of 
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likely will not come to André’s aid, as Jordan indicated to André that 
she needed funds for “her” business, and there is no indication that 
André knew of Stan’s involvement in the business at all. If there is no 
partnership and the purported partner doctrine does not apply, then the 
Partnership Act provides that Stan would not be liable to André for 
Jordan’s bad act.191 
Faced with a scenario such as this one, a court could decide to 
overlook the illegal purpose doctrine and recognize the formation of a 
partnership between Stan and Jordan so that André is not without a 
remedy (if he cannot collect from either Jordan’s or the business’s 
assets). Assuming a court would be likely to do so, then the 
consequences of the conflict between the Marijuana Laws and the illegal 
purpose doctrine are probably not so significant in practice. But it 
should also be noted that Stan is equally innocent—or guilty—in this 
scenario as André is. Stan had no involvement in the fraudulent loan, so 
he is just as blameless as André is in that respect. And both are “guilty” 
insofar as both are involved in the Retail Marijuana Business—Stan as 
an owner and André as a knowing lender.192 Because of this, a court 
 
another (principal) and is subject to the principal’s control. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). A principal is generally bound by the acts of his agent when the 
agent acts with authority. See id. §§ 6.01–6.02 (providing that disclosed and unidentified 
principals are parties to contracts made by agents acting with actual or apparent authority); 
§ 7.03 (describing principals’ liability for agents’ torts). Here, it is hard to see how Jordan could 
be Stan’s agent for purposes of obtaining a loan from André. There is no indication of any 
agreement that Jordan would act on Stan’s behalf or that Stan exerts any legally cognizable form 
of “control” over Jordan. See id. § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (describing the principal’s right to control). 
Nor is there any indication that Jordan had authority from Stan to enter into the loan 
agreement on his behalf, since he did not know about it and there was no course of dealing or 
other manifestation from Stan that would seem to lend authority to Jordan. See id. §§ 2.01–2.02 
(definition and scope of actual authority); §§ 3.01–.02 (creation of actual authority). Thus, it 
would appear that Stan would not be liable for the loan agreement as a matter of a principal’s 
vicarious liability for the acts of an agent. Stan would also seemingly not be liable for the loan 
agreement on account of having ratified it. Ratification involves “the affirmance of a prior act 
done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual 
authority.” Id. § 4.01(1). Ratification requires that the ratifier either manifest assent to the act or 
act in a way that justifies a reasonable assumption that the person assents to the act. Id. 
§ 4.01(2). Here, Stan has not assented to the loan agreement because he does not know about it. 
Nor has he had an opportunity to act in a way consistent with having assented to it, since 
Jordan never remitted the funds to the business or told Stan about it after the fact. 
 190 See supra note 125. 
 191 See Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-308(5) (“persons 
who are not partners as to each other are not liable as partners to other persons[,]” except for 
liability established by means of the purported partner doctrine under subsections (1) and (2)); 
see also supra note 125 (describing the purported partner doctrine). 
 192 See In re Medpoint Mgmt., L.L.C., 528 B.R. 178, 186–87 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2015), rev’d on 
other grounds, 2016 WL 3251581 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 3, 2016) (barring creditors’ claims in 
bankruptcy where creditors knowingly lent money to a licensed medical marijuana business); 
see also Scheuer, supra note 10, at 535 (suggesting that marijuana business owners may not face 
unlimited liability to creditors who knowingly invested in the marijuana business). 
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might not use its equitable powers to give André a remedy against Stan, 
which means that the question of whether a partnership was formed 
would have real-life consequences. 
2.     Dissolution Consequences 
If the consequences of the Marijuana Laws for partnership 
formation are hazy, the consequences of automatic dissolution are 
concrete. As explained earlier,193 dissolution means the partnership’s 
legal existence has come to an end and the partnership continues only 
for purposes of winding up its business. Let us return to Stan and Jordan 
(though this time assume Jordan is not trying to defraud André) and 
imagine that their partnership is specifically for purposes of operating a 
“Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility.”194 In setting up their business, 
the partners may have acquired certain tangible assets, such as seeds, 
grow lights, exhaust fans, and drying equipment, and contributed those 
assets to the partnership. They probably have expended money to apply 
for a “Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility License”195 and for legal 
counsel196 to help them navigate the various rules and applications. They 
 
 193 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
 194 See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.103 (2013) (amended 2017). A 
“Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility” is “an entity licensed to cultivate, prepare, and package 
Retail Marijuana and sell Retail Marijuana to Retail Marijuana Establishments, but not to 
consumers.” Id. 
 195 New applicants (i.e., those without existing medical marijuana licenses in good standing) 
must pay a $5000 application fee for a license application to be considered. See id. § 212-
2.207(A)(2). A “Tier 1” Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facility License permitting cultivation of 
1800 plants costs $1500. See id. § 212-2.208(D)(2). 
 196 This assumes that they are able to find a lawyer to advise them, which may be difficult 
because of ethical rules in some states that limit attorneys’ ability to advise clients regarding 
marijuana businesses. See Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 
91 OR. L. REV. 869, 899–905 (2013) (describing the ethical limitations on attorneys’ ability to 
counsel clients regarding marijuana law); see also, e.g., Maine Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199 
(2010), http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar_overseers_ethics_
opinions&id=110134&v=article (“While attorneys may counsel or assist a client in making 
good faith efforts to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law, the 
[Maine Rules of Professional Conduct] forbid[] attorneys from counseling a client to engage in 
the business or to assist a client in doing so.”). However, the Colorado Supreme Court recently 
adopted an amendment to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct that permits Colorado 
lawyers to “counsel a client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning” of the Medical 
Marijuana Amendment and the Retail Marijuana Amendment, and to “assist a client in 
conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by” Colorado’s marijuana laws, 
provided that the lawyers must also “advise the client regarding related federal law and policy.” 
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (COLO. BAR ASS’N 2016), http://www. cobar. 
org/Portals/COBAR/repository/rules_of_prof_conduct.pdf. Similarly, the Washington State Bar 
ethics committee has issued an opinion that permits Washington lawyers to assist clients with 
conduct that complies with Washington’s marijuana laws, though the committee cautioned that 
its opinion “may have to be reconsidered” if “the federal government changes its position and 
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may have purchased or leased property to serve as premises for their 
facility. Perhaps they have paid someone to create a website or other 
online presence for their business. Maybe they have contracts to supply 
stores with their products. Certainly, there are numerous other steps 
they may have taken, moneys they may have expended, and assets they 
may have obtained in the course of starting up their business. 
What does automatic dissolution mean for Stan and Jordan? In 
large part, it means selling off the partnership’s assets. In a different type 
of partnership this might not be so hard; either Stan or Jordan or both 
could purchase the assets. But the Rules prescribe specific standards and 
regulations that Retail Marijuana Cultivation Facilities must comply 
with, including that they may only sell marijuana to certain “Persons,” 
such as “Retail Marijuana Stores” and other Retail Marijuana 
Cultivation Facilities.197 Similarly, the Rules require a separate license 
for each specific business entity operating a Retail Marijuana 
Business,198 and limit the transfer of ownership interests in “Retail 
Marijuana Establishments” and their businesses.199 Even converting to a 
different form of entity requires informing the Marijuana Enforcement 
Division and paying the related fee.200 In sum, the process of winding up 
a Retail Marijuana Partnership—even if the business will be carried on 
by a new entity—is not only cumbersome but is also expensive.201 And 
so, if section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act triggers automatic 
dissolution of Retail Marijuana Partnerships and those partnerships do 
wind up, the practical consequences for those partnerships are 
significant. 
 
again seeks to enforce the CSA against the kinds of activities made lawful under” Washington’s 
state marijuana laws. Washington State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 201501 (2015), http://
mcle.mywsba.org/IO/print.aspx?ID=1682. 
 197 See Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.501(D) (2013) (amended 2017) 
(authorizing sales only to specific persons). 
 198 Id. § 212-2.501(B) (providing that “a separate license is required for each specific 
business or business entity, regardless of geographical location”). Changing the premises at 
which a “Retail Marijuana Establishment” operates requires permission of the Marijuana 
Enforcement Division following an application. Id. § 212-2.206(A)(1). “Retail Marijuana 
Establishments” is the term used to refer to Retail Marijuana Stores, Retail Marijuana 
Cultivation Facilities, Retail Marijuana Products Manufacturing Facilities, Retail Marijuana 
Testing Facilities, Retail Marijuana Establishment Operators, and Retail Marijuana 
Transporters (each as defined in the Rules). Id. § 212-2.103. 
 199 See id. § 212-2.205 (providing rules for transfer of ownership and changes in business 
entity form). 
 200 See id. § 212-2.205(D) (conversion of an entity of one form into another pursuant to 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-90-201 to -206 requires “a report containing suitable evidence of [the 
entity’s] intent to convert”); id. § 212-2.210(A)(3) ($800 fee per “Person” for a change of 
corporation or LLC structure). 
 201 For example, the fee for transferring ownership to new owners is $1600. § 212-
2.210(A)(1). Even reallocating ownership among owners costs $1000. Id. § 212-2.210(A)(2). 
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Of course, the key word is “if.” Along with the question of whether 
a court or regulatory body would actually carry out the law as it is 
written there is the question of how likely partners in Retail Marijuana 
Partnerships are to, first, know the law, and second, do what it requires. 
People who engage in the Retail Marijuana Business—particularly those 
who do so by means of a partnership, as opposed to an entity that 
typically carries with it limited liability, such as an LLC—may not be 
people who have a sophisticated understanding of the business and legal 
landscape in which they are operating.202 It is highly unlikely that a 
layperson would be familiar with the partnership dissolution rules and 
would think that those rules might apply to a business ostensibly 
sanctioned by the Marijuana Laws. If access to legal counsel for Retail 
Marijuana Businesses is limited,203 it becomes even less likely that those 
businesses—or the regulators enforcing the Marijuana Laws, for that 
matter—will become aware of and will follow the statutory provisions. 
In all likelihood, the automatic dissolution provisions will not pose a 
concrete problem unless they are raised in court by plaintiffs or 
defendants for other purposes—e.g., by a plaintiff partner who wishes to 
dissolve the partnership but is unable to do so under the terms of the 
partnership agreement, or by a partner defending against vicarious 
liability to a third party on the grounds that the partnership had already 
dissolved and no longer existed. 
B.     What Are Some Possible Solutions? 
In light of the practical consequences for partnerships that result 
from the inconsistencies between the Marijuana Laws and Colorado’s 
partnership laws, this Section critiques four potential solutions, one 
judicial and three legislative.204 It then advocates adoption of the final 
solution as the one that is most likely to be effective.205 
 
 202 See Scheuer, supra note 10, at 547–48 (“Instead of professionals who are primarily 
motivated by profit, as we see in other industries, we are likely to see fewer professional 
stakeholders who do not understand the risk of investing in illegal businesses, those with no 
assets outside the business that are at risk, or those who are drawn to work in this industry for 
other reasons such as their personal experience with marijuana. . . . The industry will likely 
suffer because it will attract people who are less experienced with business. In fact, it will 
primarily attract individuals who had experience dealing with marijuana before it was 
legalized.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 532 (“[M]any people forming marijuana 
businesses . . . may not be aware of the potential problems they might have with business entity 
laws.”). 
 203 See supra note 196. 
 204 There are likely other solutions that would address the consequences of the Marijuana 
Laws for partnerships, perhaps including some that aim to sweep more broadly than do the 
solutions discussed herein. The trick, of course, to any solution is to ensure that it does not 
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1.     Judicial Fix 
The first possible solution to the partnership formation and 
dissolution problem is a judicial one. Following formation of a Retail 
Marijuana Partnership, a partner in that partnership (or the partnership 
itself) could file an action in state court206 seeking two declaratory 
judgments207: (1) first, that the partnership was lawfully formed because 
 
create even more unintended consequences than the ones it aims to address. Accordingly, the 
potential solutions described in this Article are purposefully narrow. 
 205 Of course, none of these solutions will resolve the fundamental problem that marijuana 
sales remain illegal under federal law. Until that changes, or the U.S. Supreme Court blesses 
state marijuana legalization in spite of the CSA, there will remain significant risks and 
uncertainties for those who sell marijuana, even in accordance with state laws—not the least of 
which is federal prosecution. 
 206 One interesting question that arises is whether a court would be willing to participate in 
such a case at all, in light of the unclean hands doctrine. Unclean hands is an equitable doctrine 
providing that a person will not get relief from a court of equity if his or her conduct has not 
been fair, equitable, and honest in relation to the subject of the requested relief. See Salzman v. 
Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 2000) (en banc); 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 98 (2016). 
There is some question whether equitable principles such as unclean hands apply in a 
declaratory judgment action. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 387 (D. Colo. 
1956) (“There is uncertainty in the decision as to whether or not equitable maxims and 
equitable defenses apply in a declaratory judgment action.”). This is because a declaratory 
judgment suit is not necessarily a suit in equity. See Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, No. 11 Civ. 
3718(LAK), 2011 WL 3628843, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011) (stating “a declaratory judgment 
action is neither inherently equitable nor inherently legal” and noting “[t]he nature of the 
declaratory judgment action depends on the character of the underlying claim”); Buromin Co. 
v. Nat’l Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D. Del. 1947) (“[A] declaratory judgment suit is 
not a suit in equity.”). There is authority on both sides of the issue. See United States v. Fall 
River Navigation Co., 285 F. Supp. 354, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (commenting that “unclean 
hands . . . is a recognized ground to refuse to grant declaratory relief”); Buromin, 70 F. Supp. at 
216 (observing that equitable principles still apply in declaratory judgment suits); Purcell v. 
Cape Girardeau Cty. Comm’n, 322 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (“A litigant with 
unclean hands generally is not entitled to equitable relief such as an injunction or declaratory 
judgment.”). But see Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Saco, No. 12–CV–5633 (NGG)(MDG), 2015 WL 
1527611, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2015) (“The doctrine of unclean hands does not necessarily bar 
a declaratory judgment action, and its validity as a defense depends on the character of the 
underlying claim.”); Beldt v. Leise, 60 P.3d 1119, 1121 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (“The doctrine of 
unclean hands . . . does not affect the court’s authority to issue a declaratory judgment.”); 
Hogue v. Kroger Co., 373 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1963) (unclean hands doctrine does not apply 
in a declaratory judgment suit). The Colorado Supreme Court has previously invoked the 
unclean hands doctrine to refuse to grant a declaratory judgment, see Rhine v. Terry, 143 P.2d 
684, 684–85 (Colo. 1943) (en banc), and it is possible that the court might do the same here. 
 207 The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure permit the bringing of declaratory judgment 
actions to determine rights under a written contract or for purposes of construing a statute: 
Any person interested under a . . . written contract, or . . . whose rights, status, or 
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or 
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. 
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engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business is not an “illegal purpose” 
within the meaning of the illegal purpose doctrine; and (2) second, that 
the partnership did not automatically dissolve as a result of its 
engagement in the Retail Marijuana Business because such business was 
not “unlawful” for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership 
Act.208 A court’s declaratory judgments for the plaintiff presumably 
would be based on one or both of the following premises: The first is 
that both the concept of illegality in the illegal purpose doctrine and the 
term “unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) are qualified by state law—
i.e., federal law does not determine whether a partnership’s business is 
“illegal” or “unlawful” for purposes of state partnership law. The second 
possible premise is that the Retail Marijuana Amendment makes the 
Retail Marijuana Business not “illegal” or “unlawful” for purposes of all 
Colorado statutes and common law doctrines applied to entities created 
under those statutes. If a court accepted one of these alternative 
arguments and interpreted partnership common law and the 
Partnership Act accordingly, Retail Marijuana Partnerships would have 
some assurance that they are permitted to engage in the Retail 
Marijuana Business (at least as far as Colorado law is concerned) and 
are not required to wind up immediately after their formation.209 
Arguing in favor of this type of judicial solution is the fact that it 
would be difficult for a Colorado court to interpret the Marijuana Laws 
in such a way that general partnerships and LLPs are, for all intents and 
purposes, prohibited from engaging in the Retail Marijuana Business. 
As a matter of statutory construction, judges seek to give meaning to 
each term in a statute and try to avoid interpretations that would render 
 
COLO. R. CIV. P. 57(b). Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that a declaratory 
judgment action is appropriate when there is “a justiciable issue or a legal controversy extant” 
and that a declaratory judgment “is appropriate when it will terminate the controversy.” Heron 
v. City & County of Denver, 411 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo. 1966) (en banc). Accordingly, a 
declaratory judgment action would seem to be appropriate for determining rights under a 
partnership agreement and construing the Marijuana Laws and the Partnership Act to 
determine whether Retail Marijuana Partnerships are permissible. 
 208 For a similar, though broader, suggestion, see Scheuer, supra note 10, at 551–52 
(advocating a court ruling that a CSA violation by a Retail Marijuana Business does not violate 
the law for purposes of the state business entity laws). Scheuer’s suggestion (including in its 
legislative form, see id.) essentially attempts to carve out the CSA from the meaning of “law” in 
the business entity statutes so as to resolve multiple issues sparked by the inconsistencies 
between state business entity laws and state laws legalizing marijuana businesses. This type of 
broad, all-encompassing solution has the benefit of resolving multiple business entity law-
related issues generated by state marijuana laws all in one fell swoop. However, it creates a 
greater potential for unintended consequences than does a more targeted solution such as the 
one this Article proposes. It may also be difficult to implement, given the Colorado Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Colorado statutes in Coats II and Crouse. See supra text 
accompanying notes 152–56. 
 209 See supra note 205. 
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a provision a nullity.210 A judge could conceivably construe the illegal 
purpose doctrine and “unlawful” in the Partnership Act as being limited 
to state law so as to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent that 
partnerships be “persons” that are permitted to engage in the Retail 
Marijuana Business.211 
However, it is not certain that a Colorado court would embrace 
this judicial solution. First, interpreting the illegal purpose doctrine and 
the term “unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act as 
limited to state law is undesirable. This would permit partnerships to 
engage in activities prohibited under federal law, though not expressly 
prohibited under Colorado law, that Colorado would want to disallow, 
such as infringing upon copyrights.212 A judicial decision that limits the 
illegal purpose doctrine or the term “unlawful” in this way would likely 
have unintended consequences of its own. 
Second, it is unclear in light of Coats II whether a Colorado court 
would choose to hold that the Retail Marijuana Amendment makes the 
Retail Marijuana Business “lawful” (or not “unlawful”). As discussed 
supra,213 the Colorado Supreme Court held in Coats II that medical 
marijuana use was not a “lawful” activity for purposes of the Lawful 
Activities Statute because such use remains unlawful under federal law. 
On the one hand, the court’s declining to rule on the state law issue of 
whether the Medical Marijuana Amendment creates a constitutional 
right to medical marijuana use makes it possible for a Colorado court to 
 
 210 See People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 679 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (noting that, in interpreting 
statutes, courts “avoid interpretations that would render any words or phrases superfluous” 
(citing People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 73 (Colo. 2006))). 
 211 The need to construe “unlawful” in this way is reduced just slightly by the fact that 
“partnership,” as used in the Code and the Rules, almost certainly includes LPs. See supra note 
88. LPs are not subject to the same automatic dissolution provisions as are general and limited 
liability partnerships, which means their pursuit of the Retail Marijuana Business would not 
come with the same dissolution concerns as exist for general and limited liability partnerships 
(though they would have similar formation concerns). See supra note 131. If the term 
“partnership” does include LPs, and LPs can engage in the Retail Marijuana Business without 
automatically dissolving, then a court could avoid implying a state law qualification to the term 
“unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) without rendering the word “partnership” in the Code’s 
and Rules’ definition of “person” a nullity. See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-43.4-103(13) (West 2010); Retail Marijuana Code, 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-
2.103 (2013) (amended 2017) (definitions of “person” in the Code and the Rules). It seems 
unrealistic that a court would interpret the word “partnership” as referring only to LPs, 
however, especially since the court would need to reconcile its ruling with the fact that the 
Rules specifically mention general partnerships and LLPs. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
 212 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (prohibiting the infringement on 
copyright of certain works). Colorado lacks a comparable statutory provision. See Coats I, 2013 
COA 62, ¶ 18 (listing other examples of activities prohibited under federal law but not 
specifically banned by Colorado statute). Notwithstanding the lack of a Colorado statute on this 
point, the Colorado General Assembly would surely not want to sanction the formation of 
partnerships for purposes of infringing upon others’ copyrights. 
 213 See supra text accompanying note 152; see also supra text accompanying notes 167–76. 
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find the Retail Marijuana Business not “unlawful” under the Partnership 
Act on the theory that the Retail Marijuana Amendment creates a 
constitutional right to sell retail marijuana in accordance with the 
Marijuana Laws. Also, Coats II construed the term “lawful” in the 
employment discrimination context, not in a business entity law 
context, so a sympathetic court might be able to distinguish Coats II 
based on the factual circumstances. 
On the other hand, the fact that “unlawful” under the Partnership 
Act is not limited by reference to state law remains significant. 
Following Coats II, a Colorado court would likely find that the term 
“unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) refers to both state and federal law, 
and thus would be unable to declare that the Retail Marijuana Business 
is not “unlawful.” Moreover, nothing in Coats II suggests that the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s decision was strongly motivated by the fact 
that it was an employment case, or that the court would be more 
inclined to find marijuana-related activity “lawful” for purposes of 
partnership law.214 If anything, a Colorado court may be less 
sympathetic to this argument in the context of business entity law.215 
Thus, the effect of Coats II on a future ruling on the Retail Marijuana 
Amendment is not entirely predictable, and so a judicial solution cannot 
be wholly recommended. 
2.     Legislative Fix #1 
Given the problems inherent in a judicial solution after Coats, a 
legislative fix is preferable. One such fix would be to change the 
language of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act so as to limit 
the word “unlawful” to state law. For example, the section could be 
changed to read “(d) An event that makes it unlawful under state law for 
all or substantially all of the business of the partnership to be 
continued.” This suggestion poses the same problem that a judicial 
interpretation does: there are likely activities that are unlawful under 
federal law that Colorado’s legislature would not want its partnerships 
to engage in, and would not want to sanction their doing so by means of 
this language.216 Further, it does not address the issue of the illegal 
purpose doctrine. This solution is thus an inadequate one. 
 
 214 The fact that the court applied the same interpretation of “lawful” in Crouse, a criminal 
case, bolsters this argument. See supra notes 154, 156. 
 215 Surely the employee in Coats, a quadriplegic man who was terminated for “his state-
licensed use of medical marijuana at home during nonworking hours,” is a more sympathetic 
plaintiff than a partnership. Coats II, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 2. 
 216 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
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3.     Legislative Fix #2 
A second potential legislative solution is to carve out from the term 
“unlawful” in section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act activities 
that comply with the Marijuana Laws. For example, the section could be 
amended to read:  
(d) An event that makes it unlawful for all or substantially all of the 
business of the partnership to be continued . . . . For purposes of this 
section, business conducted in compliance with article 43.4 of title 12 
and section 16 of article XVIII of the state constitution217 shall not be 
considered “unlawful.”  
This solution has the virtue of greater certainty than relying upon a 
court’s interpretation of the Partnership Act, and it avoids the 
problematic restriction of “unlawful” in the Partnership Act to state law. 
But it is still not an ideal solution. First, it does not eliminate the 
illegal purpose doctrine problem. Second, to put it bluntly, it looks bad 
to have to say that statutorily authorized conduct is not unlawful. The 
obvious implication (and the reality) is that the conduct is unlawful, 
even if only as a matter of federal law. The amended language does what 
it is intended to do, but does so in an inelegant manner. It also decreases 
the uniformity of the Partnership Act with the partnership laws of other 
states that have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (1997).218 In light 
of this, changing the Partnership Act’s dissolution language in this way 
is undesirable, as well as awkward. 
4.     Legislative Fix #3 
The third potential legislative solution is the simplest and the most 
viable: an amendment of the Code to provide that partnerships that 
conduct business in compliance with the Marijuana Laws have not 
formed for an “illegal purpose” within the meaning of the illegal 
purpose doctrine and are not engaging in “unlawful” business for 
purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d) of the Partnership Act—i.e.: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Colorado state or local law, 
the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and sale of retail 
marijuana and retail marijuana products in compliance with the 
terms, conditions, limitations, and restrictions of section 16 of article 
 
 217 For completeness, this amendment should also carve out business conducted in 
accordance with the Medical Marijuana Code and the Medical Marijuana Amendment. 
 218 See supra note 138. 
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XVIII of the state constitution, this article, and the rules authorized 
and adopted pursuant to this article shall be deemed: 
(a) A lawful purpose for which to form a partnership under the 
Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (1997), section 7-64-101 et seq., 
C.R.S.; and 
(b) Not to be unlawful for purposes of section 7-64-801(1)(d), 
C.R.S.219 
This amendment would fit naturally as new subsection (7) in section 12-
43.4-901 of the Code, entitled “Unlawful acts—exceptions.” As written, 
section 12-43.4-901 enumerates a number of acts and activities that 
remain unlawful despite the Code—e.g., consuming retail marijuana in 
a licensed retail marijuana establishment, buying or selling retail 
marijuana products except pursuant to the Code and the Retail 
Marijuana Amendment, etc.220—and establishing misdemeanor 
penalties for violating the Code or the Rules.221 New subsection (7) 
could easily be added to this section to rectify the complications with 
partnership formation jurisprudence and the Partnership Act without 
the problems associated with the other potential solutions. 
Adopting a clear legislative solution such as this one would avoid 
the vagaries of depending upon judicial decisions to bless Retail 
Marijuana Partnerships. It would also eliminate one source of 
uncertainty for those eager to engage in the Retail Marijuana Business 
by means of a partnership, since it would make clear that—at least as far 
as Colorado law is concerned—their investment is not at risk of 
forfeiture because drafters of the Marijuana Laws were unable to 
anticipate and avoid all potential consequences of inconsistencies with 
other state laws. The Colorado General Assembly should adopt this 
amendment to the Code to eliminate, as much as is possible so long as 
marijuana sales remain illegal under federal law, the unintended 
consequences for partnerships of legalizing retail marijuana sales. 
CONCLUSION 
Governor Hickenlooper opposed the legalization of retail 
marijuana sales in Colorado from the outset. With the benefit of a few 
 
 219 There are certainly other statutory sections pertaining to other business entities and 
other topics that would benefit from inclusion in this amendment, and a similar amendment 
should likely be made to the Medical Marijuana Code. In line with this Article’s focus, I refer 
only to general and limited liability partnerships, the relevant provision of the Partnership Act, 
and the Code. 
 220 See Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-901. 
 221 See id. § 12-43.4-901(6). 
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years’ hindsight, he still believed Colorado’s legalization of recreational 
marijuana was “reckless,” notwithstanding his efforts to “regulate the 
living daylights out of it.”222 Whether Governor Hickenlooper’s 
negativity was warranted largely remains to be seen. What is clear, 
though, from Colorado’s retail marijuana legalization is that the 
consequences of marijuana legalization are far-reaching and hard to 
predict. It may be relatively simple to draft a ballot measure that 
legalizes marijuana sales statewide; it is far harder to implement a 
comprehensive marijuana regulatory scheme in a way that avoids 
conflicts and inconsistencies with other state statutes—particularly 
when those conflicts and inconsistencies are not readily apparent, such 
as those arising from business entity statutes. 
Two maxims ring especially true here and provide good counsel for 
other states that may choose to legalize marijuana sales in the future. 
The first is that haste makes waste. The Retail Marijuana Amendment 
mandated that implementing regulations be adopted within roughly six 
months after the amendment was signed into law by the governor on 
December 10, 2012.223 Even the most careful legislators with the best 
intentions struggle to draft comprehensive legislation on such a tight 
timeframe. Marijuana legislation, which has so many implications for so 
many diverse fields—public health, zoning, taxation, business entity law, 
etc.—is especially unsuited to rapid drafting. Emergency legislation 
adopted solely to meet deadlines may be the result, as it has been in 
Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington,224 and likely will be in the 
states that have most recently legalized retail marijuana sales. While the 
ballot initiative may be advantageous because it can produce legislative 
 
 222 See Dan Kedmey, Colorado Governor: Legalizing Marijuana Was ‘Reckless’ Decision, 
TIME (Oct. 7, 2014), http://time.com/3478057/colorado-john-hickenlooper-reckless. 
 223 See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, cl. 5(a) (mandating that regulations be adopted no 
later than July 1, 2013). 
 224 See Letter from Micaela Fowler, Dep’t of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., to Scott 
Meriwether, Office of the Lieutenant Governor of Alaska (Feb. 24, 2015), https://
www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/portals/9/pub/mcb/statutesandregulations/abc_board_
emergency_regulations_2015-02-24.pdf (Alaska emergency regulations regarding the meaning 
of “in public”); COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, MARIJUANA ENF’T DIV., STATEMENT OF BASIS AND 
PURPOSE—COLORADO RULES GOVERNING RETAIL MARIJUANA (2013), https://
www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Retail%20Marijuana%20Rules,%20Adopted%
20090913,%20Effective%20101513%5B1%5D_0.pdf (describing the necessity of adopting 
emergency rules governing Colorado’s retail marijuana sales to comply with the short time 
period for rule adoption prescribed by the implementing legislation); S. 542, 78th Legis. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/Downloads/
MeasureDocument/SB542/Introduced (Oregon emergency marijuana regulations); 16-03 
Wash. Reg. 17–21 (Jan. 6, 2016), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/law/wsr/2016/03/16-03EMER.pdf 
(Washington emergency rules to implement 2015 marijuana legislation). 
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results faster than the ordinary legislative process can,225 it may also 
speed the process to a greater than optimal extent, thereby creating the 
potential for confusion and uncertainty about the laws. Perhaps this 
result is unavoidable, given the nature of the ballot initiative process. 
Then again, perhaps some of this dilemma can be avoided if advocates 
of marijuana legalization push to include in legalizing ballot 
amendments longer lead times for drafting implementing legislation. 
The second maxim is the advice to learn from others’ mistakes, as 
one will never make enough of one’s own. Governor Hickenlooper 
seemed mindful of this when he expressed displeasure at having 
Colorado be the “experiment” in recreational marijuana 
legalization226—to be first is to have no opportunity to learn from 
others’ experiences. Some issues with state marijuana legalization are 
well highlighted, if still unresolved, such as problems with banking, 
taxation, and the like. Others, like conflicts with the doctrines governing 
formation and dissolution of partnerships and other business entities, as 
discussed in this Article, are just now coming to light. As more states 
legalize marijuana sales and join the “experiment,” (as they surely will, 
unless the Supreme Court speaks conclusively against it), more mistakes 
will be made that can be avoided by those that come after. Particularly 
in fields that have uniform statutes available and widely adopted, such 
as business entity law, the opportunities to learn from others—and to 
borrow their solutions—are widespread and relatively painless. Mostly, 
it takes a willingness to learn and the patience to put that learning to 
good use. 
This Article has proposed a narrow state solution to a problem 
arising in a narrow slice of a much broader field. As it is subject to more 
scrutiny with respect to marijuana legalization, business entity law is 
sure to be the source of more conflicts and inconsistencies with laws 
legalizing marijuana sales. Broader solutions pertaining more globally to 
business entity law may be preferable to targeted strikes against 
particular issues. But, in the same vein as legislation legalizing 
marijuana sales generally, solutions must be carefully examined before 
they are implemented, lest they, too, have unintended consequences. 
 
 
 
 225 See DuVivier, supra note 35, at 234–48 (describing the relative benefits and drawbacks of 
the ballot initiative process). 
 226 See Slothower, supra note 4. 
